Band XVI (2019/20)
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. Ibero-American Research on Brentano and his School (Mario Ariel Gonzales Porta & Evandro Brito, eds.) Presentation (S. 13-20) Mario Ariel Gonzáles Porta, Evandro Brito Primary and Secondary Sources on Brentano in Spanish and Portuguese (S. 21-36) Mario Ariel Gonzáles Porta, Evandro Brito Brentano and his School on the Psychological Method (S.37-68) Mario Ariel Gonzáles Porta Brentano and Intentionality: or How to Break Immanence from Within (S. 69-98) Luis Niel Ist alles Psychische bewusst und intentional? Brentanos These und Searles Kritik (S. 99-116) Joelma Marques de Carvalho The Originality of Franz Brentano's Description of 'Correct Love' and its Aristotelian Nexus (S. 117-136) Sergio Sánchez-MIgallón, Miguel Martí-Sanchez The Early Brentano and Plato's God (S. 137-156) David-Torrijos-Castrillejo Brentanian Continua and their Boundaries (S. 157-194) Arthur Heller Britto The Not Always Conscious Mind. A Reappraisal of Brentano's Theses (S. 195-226) Pedro M.S. Alves Kausalität, ein Prüfstein des Denkens von Franz Brentano (S. 227-250) Sara Gallardo González II. Varia A Hitherto Unknown Letter from Edmund Husserl to Géza Révész in 1913 (S. 251-264) Péter András Varga Brentano’s two stages of intentionality in Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint (S. 265-284) Hao Líu Rezension von Xolocotzi (Hg.), Actualidad de Franz Brentano, México, 2006. (S. 285-290) Klaus Hedwig |
ABSTRACTS
Brentano and his School on the Psychological Method Mario Ariel Gonzáles Porta The standard expositions of Brentano’s philosophical antecedents went no further than to recall his Aristotelian background and, against this backdrop, to indicate his assimilation of English empiricism, including John Stuart Mill, and of French positivism, primarily Comte. In recent times, this perspective has begun to be reappraised. In what follows, I propose to contribute to this reappraisal process by concentrating on the relations existing between the Brentanian program and the Germanic tradition of the “psychological method .” Brentano and Intentionality: or How to Break Immanence from Within Luis Niel The article focuses on Brentano’s conceptions of intentionality as developed throughout the different periods of his thought: first, in his early works on Aristotle and its operating notion of 'intentional’ as something objective in sensations; second, in his ‘intentionality passage’, which, based on a psychological approach, presents an immanentist account (likely Cartesian) of intentionality as a two-term relation between the mind and the immanent (or intentional) object; third, in his late ‘reistic phase’, where, due to the ontological flaws of the psychological approach, a strong ontological commitment to the ‘real thing’ is presented which leads to a new conception of intentionality as a one-term relation (as something ‘relativlich’) or as the directedness of the mind towards real things. I will first argue that Brentano’s early theory supports a form of intentional immanentism, which his later reistic account vainly attempts to break by introducing the ‘real thing’ into the intentional equation; this leads to many unsolved problems and flaws, expressed by the conceptual tension of an unclear differentiation of the concepts of thing, real, existence, and object. I will also argue that his first psychological-descriptive conception, which methodologically leaves aside existent things by inner perception, presents a more consist account of intentionality which, based on the concept of an in-existing object in the mind, breaks its immanence as it understands this object as something different from the mind itself. Ist alles Psychische bewusst und intentional? Brentanos These und Searles Kritik Joelma Marques de Carvalho The main question of this chapter is whether everything that is psychic is conscious and intentional . According to Franz Brentano consciousness as well as intentional inexistence are defining properties of the mental. In his book Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint he defines consciousness as the totality of all psychic acts, because these always have intentional inexistence . However, he defends two theses: (i) the ‘thesis of universa- lity’, i .e .: All psychic acts are conscious and intentional; (ii) the ‘thesis of exclusivity’: Only psychic acts are conscious and intentional . In this sense, consciousness and intentional inexistence seem to coincide with each other. But we still have to ask how to understand this thesis. That is why we will analyze more deeply the thesis of universality and some of John Searle’s arguments against it . For Searle brings forward some examples that are designed to prove that consciousness and intentionality are in fact to divide . Some forms of nervousness, anxiety, expectation, sadness and pain are conscious but not intentional . Two things will be clear in the end of our analysis: (1) Searle’s examples cannot refute Brentano’s thesis of universality; (2) We will understand why this discussion is important to current debates in philosophy of mind. The Originality of Franz Brentano's Description of 'Correct Love' and its Aristotelian Nexus Sergio Sánchez-Migallón, Miguel Martí-Sanchez One of Brentano’s most original and influential theses is his description of the knowledge of the good in the immediate experience of correct love, encompassing voluntary acts as well as feelings . In that union of will and feelings in a more fundamental class of psychical experiences, Brentano sees a coincidence with Aristotle’s doctrine of órexis . Yet, on Brentano’s account, while Aristotle accurately perceived correct love or desire, he did not correctly set out the knowledge of the good on this basis . The paper discusses this discrepancy and shows that the concurrence is more than merely assumed . Indeed, it is demonstrated that for both thinkers, moral knowledge is deeply rooted in the virtuous or good person . The Early Brentano and Plato's God David Torrijos-Castrillejo The interest of the young Brentano for the philosophy of Plato is linked to his Aristotelian studies . Brentano understands Aristotle’s philosophy in deep continuity with Plato’s one. This continuity is clear in one of the most controversial points of Brentano’s interpretation of Aristotle: the nature of God and the status of human soul. Brentano finds in both Plato and Aristotle a personal, monotheistic and creationistic God who also creates human soul, which is immortal. This approach is explained in some texts from the youth of Brentano, although there are signs indicating that he sustained it until the end of his life . In his interpretation of Plato’s God, we see that Brentano identifies Him with the Idea of Good and the Demiurge. The Idea of Good would have even created the other Platonic Ideas, which should be understood as gods . Brentanian Continua and their Boundaries Arthur Heller Britto Just as mathematicians were constructing the set-theoretical topological conceptions that permeate contemporary mathematical and scientific thinking, Brentano was also thinking about the subject but from a more traditional Aristotelian perspective that could not be fully harmonized with the mathematical approach. In this paper, we attempt to reconstruct Brentano’s account of continua and their boundaries, which is his response to the set-theoretical topology of his time, as well as comment on other such attempts by previous authors . The Not Always Conscious Mind. A Reappraisal of Brentano's Theses Pedro M.S. Alves In this article I discuss the three Brentanian theses of intentionality, self- consciousness, and the unity of consciousness. Regarding the first two, I argue that there is a shift in the meaning of consciousness when one passes from the first to the second, and I conclude that the best reading of self-consciousness is an intransitive one, opposing the strong transitive sense of the first thesis. Based on that, I examine whether there are non- conscious psychical acts or states . Disagreeing with Brentano, I present an empirical argument for the establishment of non-conscious psychical acts or states . Based on that, I construe the Brentanian thesis of the secondary object, presented by an intentio obliqua, as a process of time-constitution of the actuality of psychical, conscious life . Finally, I address the issue of unity of simultaneity of consciousness, presenting it in light of this new framework. Throughout the paper, especially in the first and last sections, I contrast the Aristotelian psyche-soma distinction with the modern mind- body dualism, trying to account for Brentano’s rather complex stance vis- à-vis one and the other . Kausalität, ein Prüfstein des Denkens von Franz Brentano Sara Gallardo González Because of Hume’s criticism of the law of causation and in view of Kant’s inadequate attempts to shield the necessity and universality of human knowledge, Brentano undertook a brilliant, conclusive and exhaustive defense of this principle. On one hand, Brentano makes it clear that Hume’s (and Kant’s) concept of cause is wrong . On the other, he clears up the necessity and universality of the law of causation conscientiously and thoroughly . The purpose of this essay is to explain the reasons why the Brentanian account of causality is the center of his philosophy . First, the context and meaning of his approach are to be recalled in a new light, considering the central importance of causality for Brentano’s theistic world view, which will coherently shape the reform of the philosophy that he planned and started . Secondly the causal concept and the arguments for the necessity of the causal law are noted in order to analyze some conclusions later . The aim of the study is to identify questionable points in relation to the causal argument and also –based on the hypothesis of this work– to gain a better understanding of the inadequate reception, in various respects, of this crucial contribution by Brentano to the renewal of philosophy. VARIA A Hitherto Unknown Letter from Edmund Husserl to Géza Révész in 1913 Péter András Varga Brentano's Two Stages of Intentionality in the Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint Hao Líu This paper deals with Brentano’s notion of intentionality, aiming to ela- borate on the puzzles surrounding it: the distinction between mental and physical phenomena, how to interpret intentional in-existence, the non- existent object, and the implication of “in” in “in-existence” . Meanwhile, Brentano’s notion of intentionality varies in his two stages of PES . The change Brentano made in the second stage, I think, results from the con- fusion between content and object in the first stage. Based on these, this paper provides a comprehensive and dynamic picture of Brentano’s topic of intentionality. Rezension M. Xolocotzi (ed.), Actualidad de Franz Brentano, México, 2006 Klaus Hedwig |