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Table of contents Guillaume FRÉCHETTE Introduction. (x-x) John WOODS Obituary - Dale Jacquette 19 April 1953 - 22 August 2016 (x-x) Franz BRENTANO Die Gesetze der Wechselwirkung der Naturkräfte und ihre Bedeutung für die Metaphysik (x-x) Franz BRENTANO Zur Einstein-Lorentz’schen Frage und zu Lorentz’ Erklärungsversuch der von Michelson gemachten Erfahrung (x-x) Uriah KRIEGEL Brentano’s Latter-Day Monism (x-x) Adrian MAÎTRE Brentanos Gedankengang beim Beweis zum Dasein Gottes (1915) (x-x) Dale JACQUETTE † Brentano’s Signature Contributions to Scientific Philosophy (x-x) Ben SHEREDOS Brentano’s Act Psychology was not Aristotelian (or at least, not empirical) (x-x) Denis FISETTE Phenomena and Mental Functions. Karl Bühler and Stumpf’s Program in Psychology (x-x) Peter Andras VARGA The Impersonalien Controversy in Early Phenomenology. Sigwart and the School of Brentano (x-x) Mario Ariel González PORTA Kerry and the Evolution of Frege’s Critique of Psychologism (x-x) Klaus HEDWIG Buchrezension: Franz Brentano, La psicología de Aristóteles, con especial atención a la doctrina del entendimiento agente. Seguida de un apéndice sobre la actividad del Dios aristotélico, Madrid: Ediciones Universidad San Dámaso, 2015. (x-x) Christian ALLESCH Buchrezension: Mauro Antonelli (Hrsg.) Briefwechsel zwischen Brentano und Fechner, Berlin: De Gruyter, 2015. (x-x) Giuliano BACIGALUPO Buchrezension: Franz Brentano, Aristotele e la sua visione del mondo, edited and translated by Federico Ferraguto, Firenze: Le Lettere, 2014 (x-x) Hamid TAIEB Buchrezension: Denis Fisette and Riccardo Martinelli, Philosophy from an Empirical Standpoint. Essays on Carl Stumpf, Amsterdam: Brill, 2015. (x-x) Michele PAOLINI-PAOLETTI Buchrezension: Dale Jacquette, Alexius Meinong, The Shepherd of Non-Being, Dordrecht: Springer, 2015. (x.-x) |
Abstracts
URIAH KRIEGEL: Brentano's Latter-Day Monism The recent literature on the metaphysics of material objects has featured extensive discussion of monism, the thesis that the world as a whole – the cosmos – is the only material object, or at least the only fundamental material object. A notable byproduct of the growing interest in monism has been a rather energetic reexamination of historical forms of monism. Philosophers whose monist metaphysics has earned serious reconsideration include Parmenides (Rea 2001), Spinoza (Goff 2012, Guigon 2012), the British idealists (Schaffer 2010b) and some of the latter’s American counterparts (Zimmerman forthcoming). One philosopher whose monistic musings have not yet been excavated as part of this general movement, however, is Franz Brentano. In a single known document – a dictation from 30 January 1915 (when he was 77 and completely blind) – Brentano develops what appears to be a version of monism about the material world. This brief note offers a presentation of Brentano’s specific version of monism, and of his master argument for it. ADRIAN MAÎTRE: Brentanos Gedankengang beim Beweis zum Dasein Gottes (1915 DALE JACQUETTE †: Brentano’s Signature Contributions to Scientific Philosophy Brentano’s agreement with the discovery of inner sensation or perception and the faculty of active intellect in Aristotle reflects the exact meaning by which both thinkers regard philosophy and philosophical psychology or philosophy of mind as (externally and internally) empirical and by extension (externally and internally) scientific. Brentano’s psychology is scientific in an Aristotelian sense directly inspired by the arguments of De Anima. It recognizes and builds its explanations on inner as well as outer sense and perception in establishing empirical experiential foundations for knowledge. Aristotelian-Brentanian philosophical psychology avails itself of the mind’s active as well as passive cognitive capabilities in taking the first steps toward a scientific proto-phenomenology. It is in his combined expansively outer and inner empirical psychology of passive and active intellect that Brentano’s signature contributions to an Aristotelian sense of scientific philosophy are most instructively ascertained. BEN SHEREDOS: Brentano’s Act Psychology was not Aristotelian (or at least, not empirical) Brentano’s Psychology constantly refers to mental phenomena as “mental acts,” yet there has been surprisingly little effort devoted to discerning the significance of the term “act” in this context. A widespread implicit view is (1) that it is merely a technical term, and does not literally invoke any connotations of action at all. But since many regard the Psychology as riddled with Aristotelian assumptions, some also suggest (2) that Brentano’s talk of “mental acts” is a significant holdover from his Aristotelian pedigree. Here I argue, negatively, that both claims are deeply problematic. First, traditional readings of Brentano (by, e.g., Oskar Kraus) in terms of (1) are incapable of supporting some of Brentano’s most central commitments regarding inner perception and the method of psychology. Second, Brentano’s own conception of Aristotelianism is such that if (2) were true, (1) would be false. Finally, if (2) were true in any significant sense, then Brentano would simply fail to do what he sets out to do in his empirical psychology. I thus call for renewed attention to Brentano’s conception of “mental acts.” DENIS FISETTE: Phenomena and Mental Functions. Karl Bühler and Stumpf’s Program in Psychology This study focuses on the influence of the work of Carl Stumpf on the thought of Karl Bühler. Our working hypothesis is based on the philosophical program that Bühler attributes to Stumpf and to which several of his works are largely indebted. It is divided into five parts. The first is intended to establish a relationship between Bühler and the school of Brentano to which Stumpf belongs. In the second part, I show that Bühler became aware of Brentano’s ideas and of Stumpf’s program during a stay at the Institute of Psychology of Berlin during the winter semester 1904-1905, and I briefly comment, in the third part, on Bühler’s references to the work of Stumpf and on two of his books in which he defended Stumpf’s program against his critics. After having established the solid knowledge that Bühler had of Stumpf’s work, I outline, in the fourth part, the main aspects of this program and evaluate, in the fifth, how Bühler uses it in the field of sensory phenomena (gestalt). I conclude this study with several remarks on Stumpf’s positive evaluation of the work of Bühler. PETER ANDRAS VARGA: The Impersonalien Controversy in Early Phenomenology. Sigwart and the School of Brentano MARIO ARIEL GONZÁLEZ PORTA: Kerry and the Evolution of Frege’s Critique of Psychologism Frege’s criticism of psychologism evolved over time. The main point of this evolution is the passage from the criticism of psychologism in the “Foundations of arithmetic” to that of the “Basic laws of arithmetic”. The determining role in this passage is played by the criticism Frege received from Kerry. |