

Brentano and Mauthner's critique of language

1.

At first sight, there seems to be no common basis for comparison between Brentano and Mauthner, not even in terms of method: analytical and exact in the case of Brentano, syncretic and belletristic in the case of Mauthner. Nevertheless, the two authors share a similar background: French and English positivism, Aristotelian studies, a deep knowledge of psychology and above all of English empiricist psychology - Mill especially - as well as a declared anti-Kantian stance.¹ On careful consideration, the analogies between them multiply until they reach a point of significant convergence in the theme of a common critique of language.² This will be the thesis that I shall seek to demonstrate here, bearing in mind subsequent developments in the theory of language.

2.

From the early 1900s onwards, Brentano did not merely manifest a new reistic and nominalistic emphasis in his doctrine, but increase also his output of critical reflections on language.³ That there exists a *critique* of language in his writings goes without saying. My hypothesis here, however, is that there is also (albeit only in outline form) a *theory* of language, one centered above all on the problem of communication. And it is this element in Brentano that allows comparison with the *Sprachkritik* of Mauthner.

The ontological presuppositions that have a direct influence on the conception of Brentano critique of language concern above all his reistic breakthrough, and may be seen as deriving from (i) the theory of quasi-relatives and of the modes of temporal representations, (ii) the theme of the difference between object and content in presentation and in judgment, (iii) the attributive synthesis in the formations of *Objectganzen*, (iv) the theory of double judgment and (v) the theory of substance.⁴

3.

According to Brentano, language has an *intentional* nature, it is used deliberately and intentionally to communicate the thoughts of the speaker (*Kundgeben*);

but it also has a *rhetorical* force, intended to arouse a certain thought in the hearer or to have him assume a certain argument. This conception can be correlated with the other definition of language as a *thematic unity*, whereby the communication of a content from addresser to addressee takes place through the judgmental whole in which are distinguishable parts in syntactic concatenation what takes on only synsemantic value; i.e. their significance is only relative to the relevant judgemental whole. The structural unity of the judgment owes its fundamental significance to the character of the internal reference marks, which are addressed more to the communicative than to the expressive function. Hence a series of devices are necessary, such as the employment of abstract terms or of different forms in the use of complex series of sentences.⁵

The complexity of mental and psychological acts, unitarily present in every moment of consciousness, finds in the diachrony expressed by words a form of *compression* and *ellipsis* which reduces its complexity and gives rise to linguistic events. The theory of language that Brentano outlines in his analytical critique of language has a strongly pragmatic-rhetorical character, by virtue of the importance assigned to the hearer in the constitution of an intended meaning. In linguistic communication, in fact, a speaker not only provides information concerning his thoughts (*Kundgabe*), he also seeks to arouse a certain concept in his audience (*Ausdeckung*). And what is transmitted from the addresser to the addressee is the content or meaning.⁶

The synsemantic character of language considered as a whole entails the classification of the majority of grammatical terms as abstract terms and, therefore, as mere linguistic fictions, due for the most part to the mechanisms of conceptual reduction expressed in language for the purpose of communication.⁷

4.

Abstract terms and metaphors play a crucial role. Having reconstructed the fictitious origin of abstract terms in the realm of descriptive psychology, Brentano shows that their synsemantic, grammatical essence derives from use (*Gebrauch*) and linguistic convenience (*Bequemlichkeit*). In the class of names, for example, *abstracta* perform an important function - e.g. in the formulation of scientific theories.⁸ He observes that if a definitive understanding of *entia rationis* is to be arrived at, grammar may be of use in subjecting to analysis the multiplicity of linguistic locutions present in it; locutions that, moment-by-moment, assign to terms the role of subject and of predicate.⁹ From this point of view, the fiction may be defined as a product of the synthesis of presentations, of the linking together of presentations that takes place in the attributive mode (*die attributive Vorstellungssynthese*).¹⁰ These are fictional formations (*Vorstellungsgelbilde*), conceptually close to assumptions (*Annahmen*), insofar as there is a judge that judges, even if, in fact, a judgment does not occur.¹¹ The error lies in attributing

a semantic value to the names of *abstracta*, an attribution which leads to the formation of non-reals (*Irreales*).

As is widely known, Brentano's reism envisages only two cases: either its user makes a knowing assumption (*bewußte Fiktionen*) or he commits an error.¹²

The doctrine of non-real objects, seen as deriving from the fictitious character of most linguistic terms, explains the multiple ways in which we have things for objects.¹³

5.

Die Lehre vom richtigen Urteil is one of the main sources for analysis of Brentano's critique of language. Here language is defined as an instrument used for the purpose of the communication of thoughts (*Gedankenmitteilung*), to which linguistic expression is connected through the association of ideas.¹⁴ Bearing in mind the three fundamental classes of psychic phenomena, Brentano believes that all three should be able to find a form of expression in language. There exist names that *per se* do not express any psychic phenomenon and there exist synsemantica (letters of the alphabet, syllables, articles, pronouns, oblique cases, adverbs),¹⁵ whereas categorematic expressions are only names that express a presentation, a psychic phenomenon, of the type that often serve as predicates in the classical categorical proposition.¹⁶ Only those things that fall under the concept of the real provide an *object* for psychic relations. Moreover, no object is represented in its complete individuality, but always only with a greater or lesser amount of generality.

From a linguistic point of view, the only proper name (*echter Name*) is "a thinker", while the other terms, as genera and species, are synsemantic.¹⁷ Thus abstract names are linguistic fictions, although used in a meaningful linguistic whole.¹⁸ If only things can be represented and translated into proper names, it is not possible to talk of a new layer of being for pseudo objects, which thus collapse into mere linguistic entities or *ficta cum fundamento in re*.¹⁹

6.

The auto-semantic name has, moreover, three functions:

- a. The name stands in relation to the act of presentation, in the sense that what is named presents something; hence the name *gibt etwas kund*.²⁰
- b. The name stands in relation to a content of presentation; it means something and refers to a concept (*bedeutet und hinweist*).²¹
- c. The name stands in a relation to objects, to which presentation corresponds; in this case it denominates (*nennt*) the object. A name denomi-

nates the object through its meaning, which concerns only one aspect (*Merkmal*) of the presented object. This entails synonymy at the linguistic level, since, as we know, a presentation is never able to give the object as a whole but, from moment to moment, only one of its aspects or one of its parts.²²

The triple nature of the *function* of the name thus becomes clearer: there exists a relation between name and *act*. Thus, what is named presents something and has the function of giving information about a thought by expressing it in words. The name also stands in relation to the *content* of presentation and denominates the *object* through a meaning; this explains synonymy, insofar as most names denominate the object not according to the entire meaning but only according to part of it.

Now, if we work on the basis of Brentano's definition of language as the expression of the conceptual apparatus (*Ausdruck des Begriffsapparatus*) and as the communication of thoughts (*Mitteilung von Gedanken*), it is possible to draw up a classification that distinguishes between:

1. a critique of language as a doctrine of the categories;
2. a critique of language as a theory of language.

7.

Let us treat the former as acting as, to use Marty's expression, a *beschreibende und descriptive Semasiologie*, which explains the relationship between the conceptual apparatus and its linguistic expressions. We apprehend this conceptual apparatus through inner perception and the expression of this conceptual apparatus is language. Logic as the doctrine of the elements of our conceptual apparatus and psychology of thought understood as descriptive psychology are interrelated. Seen in this light, names communicate an act of presentation directed towards a real entity; they arouse a thought through an understood meaning, they denominate real things. And taken strictly, Brentano's writings on the critique of language with their extreme point of view on the generality and assertiveness of inner perception lead to a sort of solipsism as far as the *exact* communication of our thoughts is concerned. In fact, the generality of inner perception guarantees the objectivity of consciousness as far as evidence is concerned. Hence, in the realm of logic, the problem of an intersubjective foundation of meaning does not even arise; indeed, in the realm of the name understood *im logischen Sinn*, Twardowski's tripartite division of the function of the name (*Kundgeben, Ausdeckung, Benennung*) holds, - in the sense that in this case the critique of language is directed towards analysis of names understood in logical terms - i.e. names of things or real entities.²³ However, the auto-semantic function of names is only such if they are considered in isolation from the communicative circuit - that is, if they are analyzed only in a logical, descriptive sense, in a descriptive grounded doctrine of the categories, where the

name corresponds to the presentation, the assertion to the judgment, interest awakening expressions to the motions of the soul.

8.

By contrast, the second of Brentano's definitions of language shifts more towards the aerea of the *Umgangssprache*. Here there is no symmetrical coordination between thought and linguistic signs; this is the realm of a diachronic *genetic semasiology*. To this belong the structures of everyday language, ellipses, metaphors, synonymy, homonymy and all the possibilities of equivocation. It is more expressive of the plurality of modes of presentation and therefore stands closer to indication and linguistic reference. It is here that the asymmetry between grammatical essence and the real logical form of the previous realm manifests itself.²⁴ In fact, here it is the *synsemantic* function of names that predominates, a function accentuated by its inclusion in the communicative circuit. The genetic theory deals not only with the individual who thinks and transmits his thoughts but also with the ways in which he expresses them and with the individual who receives and interpretes them. Thus, the three functions of the name are subject to constant modification as the situation changes, a situation that cannot be halted at any static moment 'now'. Rhetorical features and contents play the leading role, because the message depends as much, to use Bühler terms, on the signal as on the symptom – on the *Auslösung* as much on the *Kundgabe*. The symbol, or the final communicative outcome negotiated through communication, has therefore an imprecise meaning, one that is more grammatical than logical. This leads to the conclusion that a name that designates a thing *im logischen Sinn* has auto-semantic value because it refers to facts of inner experience, whereas the name *im grammatikalischen Sinn*, within the context and in the linguistic discourse cannot but involve accentuation on its relative synsemantic force. However the discourse addressee will never be in possession of assertive certainty of what our solipsist extension of the seeing subject (*Modalbefassung des Seiendes*) might be.

9.

After analysis of Brentano's critique of language - which from a logical point of view was always of the nature of a proposal for a logical reform of language - we now move on to treatment, from the standpoint of the name understood *im grammatikalischen Sinn*, of its analogies with Mauthner's critique of language. We shall see that the component of genetic semasiology in Brentano allows comparison with the communicative, pragmatic and performative perspective of Mauthners' *Sprachkritik*. The fundamental theoretical element that permits such comparison is their shared emphasis on the rhetorical force of language - the

appeal that the speaker directs to the hearer. Such an appeal is possible only if there exists the minimal common condition of a system of meanings and contexts usually available to the everyday language of the discourse coparticipants. Appeal and communication are made possible by the process of signification itself, through the transmission by the speaker of a content that must necessarily be interpreted by the hearer. The ambiguity of translation derives from the multiplicity of semantic categories and communicative functions that shape each individual expression depending on the way that the communication effectively develops. Every translation or comprehension of intended meaning is nothing but a constant comparison among different individual inner linguistic forms (*innere Sprachformen*).²⁵

10.

If the critique of language in Brentano operates partly on the logical level, Mauthnerian philosophy identifies itself totally with the critique of language and precisely *im grammatikalischen Sinn*.²⁶ It is possible to provide a summary of Mauthner's theory on a thematic basis.

a. *Language as metaphor*

Mauthner's treatment emphasizes the aesthetic, communicative, analogical, ordinary and above all original dimension of the phenomenon of language, and proposes a poetic solution (*Sprache als Kunstmittel*). Metaphor is the origin and nature (*Ursprung und Wesen*) of language, the fundamental form (*Grundform*) of its development. This entails the impossibility of knowledge in itself of the world of reality. At best we can produce approximative images bound to individual presentations of it. It also means that, for Mauthner, our senses are of a contingent (*zufällig*) nature, senses from which we derive perceptions (*Wahrnehmung*) or complexes of sense impressions.

b. *Language as etymology*

The science of language deals with its objective aspect, and is developed on the basis of both linguistic observable phenomena (comparative linguistics and *Völkerpsychologie*) and of interpretations that concern social reality.²⁷ In fact, a distinction is drawn between the phenomenon of language as such and the study of linguistics on the basis of a psychologistic theory. From this point of view, language is defined as a *mass product* (*Massenprodukt*) on the basis of its value as merchandise (*Ladenwert*), and Mauthner's critique of language employs the paradigm of an anthropological foundation of language as one of various human activities.²⁸

c. *Language as a catalogue of the world: grammar and syntax*

Here a grammar is set out. This examines the word through its *use*, where of interest is not so much its expoundable rules as customary usage, that is, its instrumental function of ordering (*Anordnung*) the world of reality through the explication and definition of *points of view*.²⁹ Thus understood, grammar is governed by general systems of coordinates - the *adjective*, the *noun* and the *verb* -, which correspond to the various stances that can be adopted vis-a-vis the world.

Syntax is identified with the real situation of speaker and hearer in linguistic communication itself, and as such constitutes the medium and the synthesis of grammar and logic. Syntax, in fact, is that which renders *communicable* or *manifest* the flow of thoughts between speaker and hearer. Fundamental for the transmission of thought is the succession of presentations, as is aroused via words. In this succession lies our ordering of the world of reality, and in it we present our point of view vis-a-vis reality. To this area belong Mauthner's thoughts on *ellipsis* and the theme of linguistic *context* - both reduced to analogies or linguistic habits which avoid redundancy in communication. Syntax, moreover, even with the most punctilious codification of its rules, is never able to express the relation that exists between real subjects and objects, between the self and the world that the self perceives. The succession of words is fundamental in syntax, since it expresses the order by which we present reality according to our specific interests. It enables us to establish a connection, to relate that which is said and which may be object of expression (the predicate) to the intuition (*Anschaung*) - which may not show itself in verbal ostension and which, on its own, constitutes something real. Concepts and/or words are activities of thought (*Denkakte*). They are real and proper movements (*Bewegungen*) in the phenomenalist sense, distinct one from another only in relation to the mode in which the attention is related to them.³⁰ Thinking and speaking coincide, because speaking is the use that is made of the signs of memory. Language is not an object for use, neither is it a tool; above all it is not an object. Language is use, linguistic use itself.³¹

11.

The general philosophical underpinning for Mauthner's conception of language derives from a cultural background of pragmatism, together with a not clearly defined conception of the life-experience (*Lebenserfahrung*), which he takes from Mach.³² Moreover, the identity of thought and word is not presupposed but it is demonstrated on the basis of their fundamental unity of origin (*Ursprung*), which constitutes the key to the unravelling of this question.

Essentially machian is the framework of his philosophy: one remembers here of the importance of individual and genetic memory, of association as the basis functions of our species' development.³³ And, moreover, the assumption of the reciprocal dependence of the experienced data in space. This kind of functional

reciprocal dependence of elements - in mathematical sense - formed the machian conception of the importance of the spatial boundary of our body, the so called U boundary.³⁴ Starting from this machian conception, then, Mauthner derives the reciprocal dependence of continuous changing presentations too, considering psychic and physic phenomena as the same, different only from the way of considering them. Every concept, consequently, even those of 'thing' and 'I', are merely fictional, since they owe their origin to a special kind of method, that one of continuous variation among elements. In this continuous variation from sensible presentations, through common sense to scientific thought, also concepts and words follow only one rule, that of analogy. The meaning of words, then, is to be searched in the various series of associations which they recall to the memory. Hence the relevance of etymology and the principal task of philosophy as critique - therapy - of language.

12.

I have said that adjective, noun and verb correspond to three stances that may be adopted vis-a-vis the world. Mauthner's last work was entitled *Die drei Bilder der Welt* and represents his final critical view of language. Adjective, noun and verb are the three formative functions leading to our *Weltanschauung* or world picture. Mauthner cites the Renaissance humanist Lorenzo Valla who, by reducing the Aristotelian table of categories to three, had apparently provided the solution to the problem set out in the *Sprachkritik*. The aim of this work is to examine the conditions and special features of the three 'images' corresponding to adjective, noun and verb respectively and to see if it is possible to reunite them in a unitary conception of being. In order to avoid assuming non-real entities, Mauthner limits the use of the categories to the realm of psychology only, both as regards their origin and as regards the possibility of their logical use, which in Mauthner's philosophy will be proved to be impossible. He rejects realism or Platonism which he sees as being due to a too substantial view of the world and to a primitive conception of the natural sciences and their thingly treatment of reality. For Mauthner, it is only our consideration of the world moment-by-moment via linguistic expressions, that in the last analysis is given to us, and in the form of sense impressions, ordering of things and sequence of changes. There is no world other than this. The only categories, therefore, are these three possible psychological 'images' or psychological 'intuitions'.³⁵ Since their origin is arbitrary, depending on the individual and is established voluntarily by the subject by means of an intentionality addressed in a particular direction, these images of the world are distinguished one from the other, not so much by their object as by their mode of considering it. They are our relative, arbitrary system of coordinates and of reference, the only way we have of conceiving the world of reality. The irreducible nature of the three points of view leads to the checkmate and final silence, or suicide, of the critique of language. Philosophy

remains as critical attention to language which has the primarily therapeutic function of denouncing linguistic fetishism.

13.

Trying to impose order on the Borgesian universe of Mauthner is an arduous task; I have attempted to show the nucleus of argument within the *Sprachkritik* - as expression of a speculative grammar underlying language - that is able to restore unitariness to the themes listed above.

The nominalist thesis becomes that of the univocal designation by a subject who may, however, during the operation have changed his mind. Here we have the chief source of equivocation, which occurs every time that a change in signifying intention is not matched by an appropriate expressive device with respect to the effective meaning conveyed in the language. The resultant scepticism derives from the inarticulated identification of the effective meaning with the codified grammatical form, or when thought and language are treated as being equivalent from a merely linguistic point of view.³⁶ Thus equivocation lies not so much in the linguistic carelessness or incompetence of the individual who moment-by-moment produces a speech act; rather, it is to be found in already consecrated, codified literary uses, and the treatment of these becomes one of the most powerful elements of the critique of language. At bottom, the whole of Mauthner's *Wörterbuch* is to be taken as an attempt to resolve a number of important equivocations in philosophical literature.

14.

In point of fact, it is at the very least possible to argue for the presence in Mauthner of a confusion between a pragmatic of communication and a theory of knowledge, culminating in the identification of thought with speech, derived from his machian phenomenalism. A solution to the impressionism that generally characterizes his critique of language must meet the requirements of a theory of language able to harmonize, from the linguistic point of view if nothing else, the three Mauthnerian world pictures.

Consider the four axioms of Bühler's *Sprachtheorie*. The first (*Organonmodell der Sprache*) summarizes the nature of language as an instrument for communication; the second (*Zeichennatur der Sprache*) its semiotic nature; the third (*Leistungen der Sprache*) the performative, functional aspect of language in its four manifestations (*Sprechhandlung*, *Sprachwerk*, *Sprachakt* and *Sprachgebilde*); and the fourth (*Symbol-Feld-System vom Typus der Sprache*) the double system of field and symbol typical of language.³⁷ The fourth axiom sheds considerable light on Mauthner's position, since the double system of language entails both simple communication and the extended communication that conveys not only

the field and the code but also change in the code. This latter field is the special realm of the linguistically symbolic, which, in the course of linguistic behaviour, establishes a second class of means of syntactic construction and comprehension, identifiable under the name of context (*Kontext*). Situation and context are the two sources for every form of linguistic exteriorization.

15.

For the purposes of providing a summary of the various topics dealt here, it might be said that the descriptive critique of language in Brentano is a *Vorarbeit* of a genetic kind, preparatory to and collateral with a descriptive psychology, and designed to eliminate the fictions and idola that are inevitably to be found in linguistic communication. That this is a critique of the reason conducted in an exact and analytical fashion in no way reduces the possibility of an ontology, albeit strongly reist, guaranteed in the last analysis by the fact of inner perception relative to the representation of things, and guarantor in its turn of the symbolic translation performed by the common *innere Sprachform*. Mauthner's critique of language, as a profession of scepticism and with a highly therapeutic value, is equally concerned to clarify linguistic expression, but, in contrast, displays a substantial conventionalism in favour of an anthropological foundation of language as a human activity.

It is to Mauthner's credit that he exploded the illusion that it is the task of the philosophy of language to achieve a logical or scientific analysis of language itself as an abstract structure. Language, as he never tired of pointing out, is inseparable from the speech forms in which it is expressed. It is apparently possible to conclude, therefore, that if speech cannot be reduced either to the logical structure of coordination, or to the operational structure of use or to the impressionistic use of poetry, then only examination of the stratified intersections and overlaps between its language varieties can account for it.³⁸

Bibliography

F. Brentano:

- 1862 *Von der mannigfachen Bedeutung des Seienden nach Aristoteles*, Freiburg i.Br.: Herder 1862, Hildesheim: Olms 1960, 1963, 1984.
- 1874 *Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt*, I, O.Kraus ed., Leipzig: Duncker & Humblot 1874; Leipzig: Meiner 1924; Hamburg: Meiner 1971.
- 1911 *Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt*, II, "Von der Klassifikation der psychischen Phänomene", O. Kraus ed., Leipzig: Duncker und Humblot 1911; Leipzig: Meiner 1925; Hamburg: Meiner 1971.
- 1928 *Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt*, III, "Vom sinnlichen und noetischen Bewußtsein", O. Kraus ed., Leipzig: Meiner 1928; F. Mayer-Hillebrand ed., Hamburg: Meiner 1968, 1974.

- 1930 *Wahrheit und Evidenz*, O. Kraus ed., Leipzig: Meiner 1930; Hamburg: Meiner 1968, 1974.
 1933 *Kategorienlehre*, A. Kastil ed., Leipzig: Meiner 1933; Hamburg: Meiner 1968, 1974, 1985.
 1933 *Die Abkehr vom Nichtrealen*, F. Mayer-Hillebrand ed., Bern/München: Francke 1966; Hamburg: Meiner 1977.
 1956 *Die Lehre vom richtigen Urteil*, F. Mayer-Hillebrand ed., Bern: Francke 1956; Hamburg 1965.

F. Mauthner:

- 1901ff *Beiträge zu einer Kritik der Sprache*, 3 vols., Stuttgart 1901-1902; 1906-1912; Leipzig 1923.
 1910 *Wörterbuch der Philosophie*, 2 vols., München and Leipzig 1910; 3 vols., Leipzig 1923-1924.
 1925 *Die drei Bilder der Welt*, Monty Jacobs ed., Erlangen: Verlag der philosophischen Akademie, 1925.

Notes:

- 1 In Mauthner, however, we find the influence also of Vico, Hamann and Mach.
- 2 The most important brentanian text in this respect is *Die Lehre vom richtigen Urteil*, Einleitung and Part I.
- 3 This conception developed by Brentano is to be found in *Wahrheit und Evidenz*, *Kategorienlehre*, *Vom sinnlichen und noetischen Bewußtsein* and in *Die Abkehr vom Nichtrealen*.
- 4 Cf. F. Brentano, *Wahrheit und Evidenz*, 88. Cf. also A. Marty, *Über den Ursprung der Sprache*, Würzburg: Stuber 1875; *Untersuchungen zur Grundlegung der allgemeinen Grammatik und Sprachphilosophie*, Halle: Niemeyer 1908, 53. In a particular way, as to the theory of quasi-relatives in Brentano, cf. *Die Abkehr vom Nichtrealen*, 122-124 and his *Psychologie II*, "Von den Gegenständen des Denkens", 213-225. Especially in *Psychologie II*, "Universell Denken des und individuell Seiendes", 199-203 one notes the influence of Stumpf. For what concerns object and content in judgment cf. *ibid.* "Von den Gegenständen des Denkens", 222-225. Cf. also *ibid.* "Die psychische Beziehung im Unterschied von der Relation im eigentlichen Sinne" and *Raum, Zeit und Kontinuum*, S. Körner and R.M. Chisholm eds., Hamburg: Meiner 1976, 124 ss., and also *Vom sinnlichen und noetischen Bewußtsein*, 49. Cf. also *Psychologie II*, "Von den wahren und fiktiven Objekten", 158 and footnote 1, 297. For what concerns the theme of the attributive synthesis cf. *Psychologie II*, 162, 163, where Brentano quotes the discussion on abstract names by Leibniz in *Nouveau Essais*, II, ch. 23, par. 1.
- 5 Cf. F. Brentano, *Die Abkehr vom Nichtrealen*, "Sprechen und Denken", 323.
- 6 Cf. F. Brentano, *Wahrheit und Evidenz*, 88. Cf. also A. Marty on synsemanticity of parts in proposition, in *Psyche und Sprachstruktur*, O. Funke ed., Bern: Francke 1940, 170 ss.
- 7 Cf. A. Marty, *Über das Verhältnis von Grammatik und Logik*, *Symbolae Pragenses*, Wien 1893, in *Gesammelte Schriften*, J. Eisenmeier, A. Kastil, O. Kraus eds., Halle: Niemeyer 1918 vol. II, 2, 57-99. As to Marty, language is a tool for purpose of communication and able to realize it. On one hand grammatics represents the aspect related to communication of thoughts of the speaker. Logic, on the other hand, represents the awakening, in the hearer, of similar psychic events. *Per se* the linguistic expression wouldn't have meaning, out of this context. As an antecedent of this theory cf. G. W. Leibniz, *Dialogus de connexione inter res et verba et veritatis realitate*. Cf. also A. Kastil, *Einleitung* to Brentano's *Kategorienlehre*. About this problem

of correspondence or of relation between things and words Brentano speaks in *Die Abkehr vom Nichtrealen*, and particularly in "Sprechen und Denken". Both the definition which we find in Brentano, the rhetoric feature of language and its stenogrammatic charakter are derived from Marty.

- 8 F. Brentano, *Psychologie* II, "Vom ens rationis", 249. Here is to be found the comparison between Brentano and Vahinger on assumptions.
- 9 F. Brentano *Die Lehre vom richtigen Urteil*, 62. Cf. also A. Marty on internal constructive form, against the conception of Erdmann, who substained the ontological value of subject and predicate. Here it is to be inserted the theory of double judgment which, for Brentano as for Marty, is reducible to a relation of identity. Cf. A. Marty, *Psyche und Sprachstruktur*, I, 132-160. On this subject cf. B. Smith, "Brentano and Marty: An Inquiry into Being and Truth", in K. Mulligan ed., *Mind, Meaning and Metaphysics: The Philosophy of Language of Anton Marty*, Dordrecht/Boston/Lancaster, Nijhoff, forthcoming.
- 10 F. Brentano, *Psychologie* II, "Anschauung und abstrakte Vorstellung", his last dictate before dying.
- 11 *Ibid.*, "Von der Modifikation der Urteile und Gemütsbewegungen durch die Modi des Vorstellens", 149.
- 12 F. Brentano, *Die Lehre vom richtigen Urteil*, 11, and *Psychologie* II, "Von den wahren und fiktiven Objecten", 310. Cf. also A. Marty, *Gesammelte Schriften*, II Abh., "Über Annahmen", 3 ss.
- 13 F. Brentano, *Von der mannigfachen Bedeutung des Seienden nach Aristoteles* and *Psychologie* III, "Vom sinnlichen und noetischen Bewußtsein", 227, 229, 234.
- 14 F. Brentano, *Die Lehre vom richtigen Urteil*, "Von den Gedanken und ihren Ausdruck in der Sprache", 25.
- 15 *Ibid.*, 36. Cf. also *ibid.*, "Sprechen und Denken".
- 16 *Ibid.*, 37.
- 17 Cf. A. Marty, "Über subjektlose Sätze und das Verhältnis der Grammatik zur Logik und Psychologie", *Vierteljahrsschrift für wissenschaftliche Philosophie*, Bde. VIII, XVIII, XIX, 1884-1895, in *Gesammelte Schriften* II, 1, 3-307. Here we find also the source of fictions and of synsemantics, since it is the place of our modifications or of our modalities of apprehension of the object.
- 18 F. Brentano, *Die Lehre vom richtigen Urteil*, 65, 68. Here is to be found the theme of anticipations which takes place in communication and its relation with the articulation of syntax.
- 19 *Ibid.*, 47. Cf. also *Wahrheit und Evidenz*, 91 ss. and, on the same subject, H. Vahinger, *Die Philosophie des Als Ob*, Hamburg: Meiner 1922, 49.
- 20 F. Brentano, *Die Lehre vom richtigen Urteil*, Hamburg: Meiner 1965, 47.
- 21 *Ibid.*, and cf. R. Haller, "Das Zeichen und die Zeichenlehre in der Philosophie der Neuzeit", in *Archiv für Begriffsgeschichte*, 4 (1959), 113-157, 47.
- 22 Cf. F. Brentano, *Psychologie* II, "Anschauung und abstrakte Vorstellung", and *Die Lehre vom richtigen Urteil*, 46 ss. On this subject cf. also L. Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*, Oxford: Basil Blackwell 1953, 59-80.
- 23 This quasi-nominalistic conception is justified by Brentano since real is only a concrete thinking individual in *Die Lehre vom richtigen Urteil*.

- 24 Cf. L. Wittgenstein *Tractatus logico-philosophicus*, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1953, 4. 00031.
- 25 This will be the symbolic field in Bühler's *Sprachtheorie*, G. Fischer Verlag 1934, now Ullstein Buch, Frankfurt/M. Berlin-Wien 1978. On linguistic forms cf. A. Marty, *Gesammelte Schriften*, and O. Funke, *Innere Sprachform. Eine Einführung in A. Marty Sprachphilosophie*, Prager Deutsche Studien 32, Reichenberg, Hildesheim 1974, XII, 134. Cf. also W. Porzig, "Der Begriff der innere Sprachform" in *Indogermanische Forschungen. Zeitschrift für indogermanische Sprach und Altertumskunde* (41), 150-169.
- 26 Cf. F. Mauthner, *Beiträge zur Kritik der Sprache*, I, 34. Cf. also L. Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*, I, 329, and G. Weiler, *Mauthner's critique of language*, London: Cambridge at the University Press, 1970, 298-307.
- 27 Cf. W. Wundt, *Völkerpsychologie*, I, *Die Sprache*, Leipzig 1900.
- 28 Cf. F. Mauthner, *Beiträge zu einer Kritik der Sprache*, I, 516 ss. and E. Mach, *Erkenntnis und Irrtum, Skizzen zur Psychologie der Forschung*, Leipzig 1926, par 10.
- 29 F. Mauthner, *Beiträge zu einer Kritik der Sprache*, I, 199 ss. c 507 ss.
- 30 *Ibid.*, III, 404 ss.
- 31 *Ibid.*, I, 24 and L. Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*, I, 43.
- 32 Cf. E. Mach, *Erkenntnis und Irrtum*, ch. 1, V.
- 33 *Ibid.*, ch. 2. 2.
- 34 *Ibid.*, 1, 6.
- 35 F. Mauthner, *Die drei Bilder der Welt*, 23, 26.
- 36 For a development of Mauthner's philosophy of language cf. B. Snell, *Der Aufbau der Welt*, Hamburg: Classen 1952.
- 37 K. Bühler, *Sprachtheorie*, Part I, 2, 3, 4, 5.
- 38 Cf. Liliana Albertazzi, *F. Mauthner, La critica della lingua*, Carabba, Lanciano 1986.