

Seeing As and Assimilative Perception*

our habitual exercise of dispositions and habits of which we have merely practical experience is one thing, it is a very different thing to have won scientific insight into these ... That there is a fundamental difference between »thinking a concept« and »giving an explicit account of this concept« is an old truth. When Augustine says of the concept of time that he knows well what time is until he is asked - it is this aforementioned difference that is at the basis of what he says. Thus in the strict sense of the word, there is *nothing* to *discover* in [descriptive] psychology but only *the exposition and unfurling (darlegen, entfalten)* of what occurs in our psyche ... (O. Funke, *Studien zur Geschichte der Sprachphilosophie*, Bern, 1927, 117)

§ 1 Aha Experiences

Most of us - even if we have read no Austro-German philosophy of mind - are familiar with experiences such as the following.

- (1) Hans comes across a series of marks and sees that the marks to his left belong together. Then he sees that actually all the marks have one of either two sizes and that the set of smaller marks form a circle in the centre of his visual field.
- (2) Hans comes across a series of marks or lines and then realizes that these are words, but words to which he can attach no meaning.
- (3) Hans comes across another set of marks and sees that they form a picture although he does not know what they (are supposed to) represent.
- (4) It occurs to Hans that the word he is using with one meaning also has a quite different meaning (perhaps because the person he is talking to is bent on improving his vocabulary, or has made a pun - or both).
- (5) Hans's contemplation of a picture of his great-grandmother gives way to his realization that what he is looking at is in fact a picture of her mother.
- (6) Hans has learnt how to write Polish notation (or *begriffsschriftlich*) but can only translate very simple sentences, then he sees how go on - that he can go on - to represent more complicated sentences.
- (7) Hans sees two objects and then notes a similarity between them.
- (8) Hans observes an indistinct shape in the distance and then sees that it is a London beggar.
- (9) Hans realizes that the figure moving towards him is that of a woman not that of a man.
- (10) Hans realizes that the expression on the face of Sam is one of amusement not one of pain. (For another list see Budd 1987, 2)

Let us now look at some descriptions of these cases of switch of aspects.

Benussi (1914) and Witasek (1910, ch. IV) give a number of examples of Gestalt ambiguity like (1). Benussi describes cases where one *heraussieht* different *Gestalten* whilst looking at carpet patterns and similar figures. He sharply distinguishes between such cases and simple sightings of a coloured patch. In cases of the former kind we notice what Wittgenstein calls »different aspects of organisation« (PI 208; LW § 530). Husserl refers to the phenomenon of aspect change in a recently published manuscript of 1893. When the transition from what, following Brentano, he calls inauthentic (*uneigentliche*) to authentic (*eigentliche*) understanding occurs too quickly to be observed this phenomenon is best described, he notes, as an »*Aufleuchten*« or »*Aufblitzen*« of understanding. (Husserl 1979, 299; unfortunately the passage in which Husserl goes on to discuss this phenomenon has not been preserved.)

Husserl describes a variant on (2):

Let us for example think [of the case where] certain figures or arabesques have had a purely aesthetic effect on us, and then suddenly the understanding dawns on us that what we are dealing with are symbols or words. Let us then keep the new situation in mind before it is brought with the help of words and thoughts to explicit logical awareness, something that can often only occur after a short space of time; thus not even a linguistic judgement (*Worturteil*) such as »a sign!«, »a symbol!« will have occurred. (Husserl 1979, 115, cf. 288; cf. LU I, § 18, § 22; LU V, § 14)

A case related to (2) and (4) is described by Wittgenstein: a word loses its meaning and is heard as a mere sound after being repeated ten times (PI ii, 214).

Husserl's elegant account of what happens in (2) and (3) (LU V, § 14, § 27) is not available to Wittgenstein since Husserl takes seriously both the uniformity of mental modes and linguistic forces and the task of describing their interrelations.

In order to understand Husserl's account consider a case intermediate between (3) and (5):

(3') Hans comes across a set of incomprehensible marks and then sees that they are a picture of his mother.

What is the relation between Hans' initial purely perceptual state and his state of pictorial awareness? On Husserl's view Hans' new mental state is a modification of his first state. In the first case he takes a complex material object to be actual, to be present (actuality here is not to be confused with the concept of existence as this is captured by the quantifiers); in his state of pictorial awareness it is *as though* an object were present. The relation of modification between modes is reflected in the relation of lexical modification between the noun phrases and verbs used to describe the two cases: »presence« and »pretend-presence«, »see« and »imagine-seeing«.¹

Although the switch described in (3') is primarily a transition from one mental mode to another, other changes are of course also involved: the *content* of Hans' mental state changes quite considerably. But we can imagine cases where a change of mode is accompanied by little or no change in content:

(3'') Hans thinks he sees Butor in the distance and then realises that what he is looking at is a life-like statue of the same.

Wherever a switch involves no change of mode but only a further specification of content then we have a case in which more detail is noticed. In (8) it is not Hans' attitude which changes, he is in a state of perceptual awareness before and after the switch, but the content of his state. We must now note a further peculiarity of (3'): in some sense of the verb »see« Hans sees the marks before and after the switch described in this example. We shall return to the question of the nature of this continuity later.

We are now in a position to understand Husserl's description of (3). Hans here undergoes a switch of modes *and* of content. From a perceptual content in which a series of marks is given to him he passes to a state of pictorial awareness the content of which is quite empty. He knows only that what he is pictorially aware of is a picture of something. Similarly in (2) Hans passes from a purely perceptual state to an act of meaning or understanding, the content of which is almost bare. Husserl, however, nowhere considers in detail the difference between the modification involved in (2) and his two paradigm cases of modification: the switch from seeing *a* to imagining *a* and the switch from judging *p* to assuming or supposing *p*.

Wittgenstein, of course, rejects any account of this sort, presumably because he is sceptical about the uniformity of forces (cf. PI, §§ 22-24) and of modes or attitudes and about the univocity of the corresponding concepts. Thus he writes about cases like (3), (3') and (5):

What does it mean to understand a picture, a drawing? Here too there is understanding and failure to understand. And here too these expressions may mean various kinds of thing. A picture is perhaps a still-life; but I don't understand one part of it: I cannot see solid objects there, but only patches of colour on the canvas.- Or I see everything as solid but there are objects that I am not acquainted with (they look like implements, but I don't know their use).- Perhaps, however, I am acquainted with the objects, but in another sense do not understand the way they are arranged. (PI, § 526; cf. PI II, xi, 210)

And about cases like (2):

Again, our eye passes over printed lines differently from the way it passes over arbitrary pot-hooks and flourishes. ... But what in all this is essential to reading as such? Not any one feature that occurs in all cases of reading. (PI, § 168)²

Wittgenstein's point is not so much that there is no episodic mental state involved in these examples as that these states are not uniform and that there is therefore nothing we can say about them in general (cf. PI, § 304). Nevertheless, whether we accept the views of Wittgenstein or those of Husserl as to the uniformity of modes, it is clear that (2) and (3) differ quite radically from (4), (5), and (7-10) because - in Husserl's terminology - the former involve changes of mode or act-quality rather than changes of content.

In his account of assimilative perception Linké describes switches of aspect like that involved in (3') with the help of the verb *ansehen*, which can be inadequately rendered as »seeing something in/an something else«. Thus

I see on a sheet of paper a half-circle and within it a point and two straight lines; suddenly - perhaps as a result of accidentally turning the sheet - I see the purely geometrical formation turned into half of a happily grinning human face: quite clearly »I see« this undoubted psychological moment »in« the totality of points and lines. *The same individual something* - determined as identical for the perceiving subject by its persistence at the same place - appears now as endowed with merely geometrical properties, now as endowed in addition with other properties. (Linke 1929, 268)

»Appears«, he notes, means »is seen as«. (Wittgenstein uses the verb *ansehen* in a slightly different sense at RPP I, § 971).

Wittgenstein's descriptions of cases like (6) are well-known (cf. PI, §§ 151-6, § 183). Within the mentalist framework of descriptive psychology the phenomenon seems first to have been described by Karl Bühler. In the paper in which the term »Aha-Erlebnis« is introduced into the literature Bühler describes the »typical cases« like (6) as experiences that contain

not only knowledge as to how this individual task is to be solved but knowledge as to how in general tasks of *this sort* are to be solved; it is an unmistakable rule for providing a solution. ... What is an awareness of rules (*Regelbewußtsein*)? A thought in which something that from a logical point of view we call a rule dawns on us. But this is not an unambiguous description. I can also simply refer to (*meinen*) to a rule as I can to any other object. Awareness of rules is not this thinking of a rule (*an eine Regel denken*) but rather thinking a rule or thinking in a rule (*denken einer Regel oder in einer Regel*). The object of rule-awareness is not the rule but the state of affairs or objective it refers to, is applicable to, from which it is perhaps derived. (Bühler 1907, 335, 339; cf. Radakovic 1906)

One important type of rule awareness, according to Wittgenstein (RPP I, § 975) and Bühler, is provided by thinking with functions:

The most beautiful and clearest cases of rule-awareness are it seems to me, [our] thinking of mathematical functions. One can for example think clearly and confidently of decrease as the square of distance without determining the positions between which the distance lies or what it is that decreases; it is the function itself that one thinks and that one has clearly in mind, whilst that of which the function is a function (*das woran sie stattfindet*), can be deprived of all content except for an indeterminate something that is just thought [along with the function] as a relational point or empty representative of the relation's content. (Bühler 1907, 340-341)

»Thinking of mathematical functions«, as Bühler's own explanations of »rule-awareness« above indicate, means »thinking in which mathematical functions are employed«. Wittgenstein, too, notes the importance of the distinction between thinking *of*, say, the derivation of a series from its algebraic formula and awareness *how to go on*, thinking through an application. (PI, § 146ff)

Immediately after discussing the case where I exclaim that I now know how to go on (PI, § 183, which refers back to § 151) Wittgenstein introduces the case of the sudden grasp of a melody: »I want to remember a tune and it escapes me; suddenly I say »Now I know it!«« (PI, § 184). Within the tradition of descriptive psychology a melody is regarded as the paradigm example of a Gestalt quality. And it is phenomena of this sort that provide us with yet another major species of rule-awareness:

Another domain in which rule-awareness occurs seems to be that of »Gestalt qualities«. When I look at the complex of lines in a complicated mathematical figure and find initially that I can make nothing of them, and it then suddenly »dawns on me« (*aufgeht*) what they involve, what is it that has »dawned« on me? Obviously, the sense of the figure; and this sense is in all cases something that involves thoughts, in many it is nothing other than their law. One need not think immediately of an exact law that completely yields the figure, often one has only a part of this law or a rough rule for constructing the figure, but - and this is the only point that interests us here - it dawns on us in an awareness of a rule that then produces that peculiar illumination of the sensible representation (*Bild*) on account of which one speaks of the dawning (of a light). Something similar occurs when I suddenly »understand« the construction of a machine or the plan of a building. (Bühler 1907, 341; on such *Bilder* cf. PI, § 141)³

Wittgenstein's remark at PI, § 539, like his famous discussion of the duck-rabbit example, considers a transition that resembles (5): »I see a picture which represents a smiling face. What do I do if I take the smile now as a kind one, now as malicious?«

Here and in the duck-rabbit case he discusses the problems presented by the role of concepts in perception by concentrating on the simplified case of perception of pictures and of what they represent (without ever going into the nature of the distinction between perception of material objects and pictorial awareness).

Of experiences in which I imagine a transition like (10) Wittgenstein writes:

I say: »I can think of this face (which gives an impression of timidity) as courageous too« ... I am speaking ... rather of an aspect of the face itself. [I do not] mean that I can imagine that this man's face might change so that, in the ordinary sense, it looked courageous; though I may very well mean that there is a quite definite way in which it can change into a courageous face. The reinterpretation of a facial expression can be compared to the reinterpretation of a chord in music, when we hear it as a modulation first into this, then into that key. (PI, § 536)

There are a number of different ways of classifying the cases described under (1-10).

One difference between (1) and all the other cases is that in the former case we have what Wittgenstein calls »purely optical« aspects whereas all the other cases involve - in different ways - conceptual aspects (RPP I, § 970; RPP II, § 509; PI II, xi, 208; Linke 1929, § 96). Now of course we can only make sense of the latter half of this distinction if we accept the thesis of Husserl - that Moore and many others did not accept - that what we normally see are events and objects and not sense-data. »I do not see colour-sensations but coloured things, I do not hear tone-sensations but the singer's song« (LI V, § 11); »I hear the adagio of the violin, the twittering of the birds ... I see a thing, this box, but I do not see my sensations.« (LI V, § 14; cf. Husserl 1979, 102)

Another important distinction, due to Benussi, is between »Gestaltmehrdedeutigkeit« and »Aufmerksamkeitsmehrdedeutigkeit«, between ambiguity of Gestalt and of what is noticed (Benussi 1914, 398). The simplest sort of purely optical ambiguity, according to Benussi, is provided by figures the foreground and background of which occupy the attention equally. In such a case we have Ge-

stall ambiguity, in all other cases (optical *and* conceptual, we might add) there is ambiguity of what is noticed.

Wittgenstein introduces his discussion of aspects in PI II, xi with a »categorical distinction« between two objects of sight. In the first case I reply to the question »What do you see there« with »I see *this*« accompanied by a drawing, copy or description. In the second case I reply »I see a likeness between [in] these two faces«. Wittgenstein's description of the first case, which may involve a description, implies that it may or may not involve the exercise of concepts. He stresses that the second case involves noticing, noticing an aspect. The claim that seeing as essentially involves a change in what is noticed applies first and foremost to those cases that involve what we have called a specification of the content of what is seen rather than cases such as (2) and (3).⁴

Wittgenstein's first case corresponds to what Husserl in the fifth Investigation calls »nominal perception« and what is often called »simple seeing«. Its main linguistic expression is given by the schema »*a* sees *b*«. Seeing as seems to be a special case of what Husserl calls »perception of states of affairs« or, as it is sometimes described today, »epistemic perception«, the form of which is »*a* sees that *p*«. If we want to leave open the question of the relation between seeing as and epistemic seeing, we might introduce a third basic structure for perceptual verbs: »*a* sees *b* as an *n*« - where the third argument of the verb is a common noun - or: »*a* sees the *F*-ness of *b*«, or: »*a* sees the *F* aspect of *b*«.

It is important not to confuse the distinction between what is and what is not noticed and the distinction between seeing or noticing something in one way (*So-Beachten*) and then noticing it in a different way (*Anders-Beachten*; Koffka 1922, 384).

§ 2 Exclamations, Episodic Knowledge and Secondary Meaning

I turn now to two traits common to all Aha experiences: exclamations and the episodic knowledge they express.

Both Wittgenstein and Bühler stress that Aha experiences involve (the expression of) knowledge: »Now I know it!« (PI, § 151, § 184). Bühler calls my sudden knowledge as to how a task is to be solved a »knowledge about« (*Wissen um*) since it is to be sharply distinguished from dispositional knowledge; »*Wissen um*« is »actual knowledge« (Bühler 1907, § 6). Similarly Wittgenstein distinguishes at PI, § 149 between a »state of consciousness« (*Bewußtseinszustand*) and a disposition in order to remove the perplexity expressed by the question »But what does this knowledge - the knowledge of one who says »Now I know!« - consist in?«

Let me ask: *When* do you know that application? Always? day and night? or only when you are actually thinking of the rule [*Gesetz der Reihe*, law of the series]? do you know it, that is, in the same way as you know the alphabet and the multiplication table? (PI, § 148)

Of course, the distinction between a psychological state and the disposition to be in such state was not, for the descriptive psychologists, merely a grammatical distinction.⁵

The characteristic expression of the experience of seeing as is an exclamation. Husserl, in the passage already quoted, describes the expression of a case like (2) in terms of the production of a one-word judgement which is an exclamation: »a sign!«, »a symbol!«. Bühler stresses in his *Sprachtheorie* the link between the experience of a change of aspect and its expression in the form of an interjection in the course of a description of the logic of the term he had coined in 1907 for this »specific experience that is well-known to everyone« (1934, 311) - »Aha-Erlebnis«.

Aha in the course of speech is, on the traditional view, not a nominal expression but a particle of intimation, an interjection; but when it is combined with the nominal expression »experience« its function takes on a somewhat different character. Grammatically speaking it becomes the substitute for an attribute and psychologically speaking the composite expression »Aha-experience« requires of the speaker »You should think of that state of mind in which you normally produce the interjection »aha«. (Bühler 1934, 311; cf. Bühler 1930, 20)

The use of words to intimate or express (*kundgeben*, *ausdrücken* or *äussern*) was frequently distinguished within descriptive psychology from their use as a means of representing states of affairs (Marty 1884, 299ff; Husserl LI I; Meinong 1977, §§ 3-4, § 7). An assertion that Sam is happy names Sam and represents a state of affairs but it intimates or expresses the speaker's reference to Sam and his belief that Sam is happy. This distinction is a distinction that can be made with respect to most linguistic episodes and forms one of the starting points for Bühler's account of linguistic functions. If we follow Meinong we may say that the use of »Sam« in our assertion means Sam, that he is the meaning (*Bedeutung*) of the meaningful use of this word, and expresses a thought or presentation of Sam. If, now, we turn our attention to the class of linguistic episodes that particularly interests us here, interjections and expressions of psychological states, then, Meinong suggests, we must distinguish between »primary meanings« of the sort just described, and »secondary meanings« (*sekundäre Bedeutung*). Meinong's example is of someone who complains of pain. He might, for example, say »I have a really terrible pain in my hand!« making a suitable grimace. In such a case we have a *secondary expression* (utterance) and a *secondary meaning*, »that the speaker is really in pain«, as Meinong puts it (1977, § 4). What is expressed and what is meant coincide. Like Wittgenstein, Meinong suggests that in such a first person case there is no such thing as my idea of my pain, my belief that I am in pain (which would be expressible in the primary sense) and hence no primary meaning, only the secondary expression or index of the secondary meaning of my exclamation, my pain. (Needless to say Meinong also develops a positive account of one's grasp (*Erfassen*) - as opposed to a presentation - of pain which is very un-Wittgensteinian; Husserl contents himself with the claim that in the case of my pain there is no distinction to be made between the content and the object of my mental state, from which it follows on

his premisses that there can be no private ostension of this pain (cf. LI V, § 15(b)).

Wittgenstein makes use of the notion of an *Äußerung* not only in his account of sentences such as »I have a terrible pain in my hand« but also in his account of first-person sentences containing »seeing as«. Such a sentence is a »characteristic utterance of the experience« (RPP I, § 13). And an exclamation (*Ausruf*) is an expression (*Ausdruck*) in a different sense than a report (*Meldung*). »It is forced from us.- It is related to the experience as a cry is to pain«. (PI II, xi, 197)

Wittgenstein's distinction between primary and secondary meanings is introduced at PI I, § 531.

We speak of understanding a sentence in the sense in which it can be replaced by another which says the same; but also in the sense in which it cannot be replaced by any other. (Any more than one musical theme can be replaced by another.)

In the one case the thought in the sentence is something common to different sentences; in the other, something that is expressed only by these words in these positions. (Understanding a poem.)

We have therefore two different uses of »understanding« (PI I, § 532), of »meaning« and of »expression« (PI I, § 533). For the concepts used to express changes of aspect do not express these in the same variable way as the concepts used in a report express the opinion of the speaker. One of the many similarities between experiencing a meaning and switches of visual aspect is that in each case the corresponding expression and meaning are secondary not primary.⁶

Wittgenstein develops the distinction between the »primary« and the »secondary meaning« meaning (*Bedeutung*) of a word in the context of his discussion of a determinate class of experiences of meaning (PI II, xi, 216). Two of his examples are: »I feel as if the name 'Schubert' fitted Schubert's works and his face« (PI II, xi, 215) and the claim that »Wednesday is fat« and »Tuesday thin« (PI II, xi, 216).

A much more convincing example from Morgenstern, discussed by Köhler, is the grasp of

Die Möwen sehen alle aus, als ob sie Emma hießen.

All seagulls look as though their name were Emma.

These peculiar experiences of meaning involve secondary meanings of which Wittgenstein says that they are not metaphorical, because I cannot express them *except* by using the concepts »thin« etc., and that they presuppose primary meanings. A secondary meaning presupposes a primary meaning not in the sense that it depends on it locally, that the one cannot occur without the other, but in the sense that a mastery of the concepts it contains depends globally on a mastery of their use in sentences with a primary meaning.

Wittgenstein describes the phenomenon of familiarity as follows:

The familiar physiognomy of a word, the feeling that it has taken up its meaning into itself, that it is an actual likeness of its meaning - there could be human beings to whom all this was alien. (They would not have an attachment to their words.) And how are these feelings manifested among us? - By the way we choose and value words. (PI II, xi, 218)

Husserl's description of what he calls »the awareness of familiarity [*Vertrautheit*]*«* of a word, awakened »either by its syntactic form or by its form and content [*Wortgehalt*]*«* (Husserl 1979, 291-2) is to be found in a recently published manuscript:

I have the definite impression (*ganz den Eindruck*) as though the word were spread across the named object according to its different intended (meant) aspects [*Momente*, i.e. individual properties] in the manner of a quality and were fused with these aspects - just as a tactile quality seems to cover a visual object by appearing to fuse with certain visual aspects (brightness, unevenness). (Husserl 1979, 286)

In such cases there is, he says, no awareness of representation; they are, we might say, intransitive cases. (But cf. Husserl 1979, 454) This impression of familiarity (*Bekannschftsqualität*) is due, Husserl claims, to the actualisation of dispositions which may also fail to be actualised. Using Husserl's vocabulary of dispositions we may say that actualisations of the disposition to feel at home in language, displays of *Sprachgefühl*, presuppose actualisations of the disposition to use language correctly and that to lack the former is to suffer from meaning blindness.

It is in the context of his discussion of two different senses of understanding - which correspond to the two different senses of expression and meaning that we have just described - that Wittgenstein repeats the well-known analogy between understanding a sentence and understanding a melody. (PI, § 527)

Hearing a word in a particular sense ...

Phrased like this, emphasised like this, heard in this way, this sentence is the first of a series in which a transition is made to these sentences, pictures, actions. (PI, § 534)

One difference between sentences and melodies is pointed out by Husserl:

When the melody comes to an end then we have a characteristic boundary, the awareness of completion. The way the melody ends does not allow me to expect or demand anything new, as does the period of a sentence. (Husserl 1979, 270).

Wittgenstein asks: »What happens when we learn to feel the ending of a church mode as an ending?*«* (PI, § 535). Husserl's answer is that in the case of unfamiliar melodies our musical experience allows us to understand what is and what is not a completed melodic whole. It is similarity that guides us*«* (Husserl 1979, 271-272).

A terminological ancestor of Wittgenstein's distinction in the *Investigations* between two senses of »understanding (meaning, expression)*«* is the distinction between »transitive*«* and »intransitive*«* uses of words in the *The Blue and Brown Books* (22, 29, 162, 166). It is in the course of this discussion that the connexion between familiarity, feeling at home and secondary meaning is brought out most fully. Wittgenstein discusses mainly aesthetic and evaluative examples - »This tune says *something**«* (BB 166). In such a case what I express and what I mean coincide. (cf. Meinong 1916, 32, 243)

One of the striking features of Aha-experiences is the way the recognition of familiarity - what Wittgenstein and Wertheimer describe as a »click*«* or »Ein-

schnappen« - often brings to mind a »Dunstkreis« »corona« or Jamesian »fringe« of associated meanings, the »Spheres« described by Messer and Bühler. Like these two Würzburg *Denkpsychologen* Wittgenstein insists - eg. at PI II, vi- that no such atmospheres and no feeling can constitute the meaning (the primary meaning?) of a word.⁷ Meaningful uses of sentences and words, as Husserl had insisted in the *Logical Investigations*, and as Messer and Bühler demonstrated, involve no images, sensations or associations. As Bühler put it, the meaning of a word cannot be *vorge stellt*, I have rather »knowledge of« it (*Wissen um*; Bühler 1907, § 6, 363). Reinach indeed was to go one step further and defend Wittgenstein's negative thesis, that meaning is not a process or state - unlike deliberation or seeing. Unlike Wittgenstein, Reinach drew the positive conclusion that my meaning something with a sentence, and so too my understanding what I say, is a punctual event.⁸

One can imagine a benighted creature the bulk of whose experiences involve a slow progression from experiences like (1) to experiences like those described in (2), followed by experiences like those described in (4) and so on. His experiences become increasingly determinate but only as a result of such a jerky progression from surprise to surprise. Closely related to this creature would be someone who is only capable of experiencing the transitions described under (1)-(10) after making an *inference* from what is reported in the first half of each of these cases to what is reported in the second half. Such creatures would be blind in every possible way except one: *gestaltblind* (Höfler 1930, § 30, 433), *aspektblind* (LWI, § 784; PI II, xi, 214), *bedeutungsblind* (RPP I, § 189), *seelenblind* (Bühler uses this notion at Bühler 1908a, 4 to describe someone who lacks inner perception,⁹ *blind to expression* (PI II, 210), *strukturblind* (Bühler 1934, 20) and *wertblind* (Lotze *Kleine Schriften*). Such a creature would be blind to everything but sensory qualities - and even these would come only in small patches, in the ways described by Katz and Wittgenstein in their writings on colour. Koffka's theories, on the other hand, according to Bühler, fail to allow that we see even sensory qualities. Koffka allows only that we see forms, and is thus, says Bühler, »theoretically *stoffblind*«. (Bühler 1929a, 153)

§ 3 Sudden and Continuous Seeing as

A life without Aha experiences would be almost as abnormal as a life in which all experiences took this form. It is tempting to think that the normal case is a mixture of both. But this is not quite right either. Aha experiences bring to the surface the relations of trust and familiarity that pervade most normal uses of language. In both Aha experiences and those cases where we express the existence of such relations of familiarity, for example with the help of exclamations, it is secondary understanding, meaning and expression that is at work. Steven Mulhall (1987) has brought out the importance of the idea of our familiarity with language in Wittgenstein's account of language: this account is not a vision

of what the descriptive psychologists would call a society in which all uses of language have become automatized; our experience of familiarity with words is, rather, a central feature of our language games.

Bühler describes the relation between ordinary experience, linguistic and psychological, and Aha experiences as follows.

One ought never lose sight of the fact that such transient structural insights [Aha experiences] are normally inseparably intertwined with the completely unintelligible effects of association and suggestion, which are well to the fore in living linguistic communication, that effect the comprehension of what is intimated (uttered, expressed). (Bühler 1929, 136)

This is merely a generalisation of points he had made in 1907 about Aha experiences. When one has become aware of these »psychological formations« (*psychische Gebilde*) that are not immediately evident, when one knows how to observe them »one finds that rule-awareness is extraordinarily frequent amongst the mental processes (*Bewußtseinsvorgängen*) that precede or accompany speech. (Bühler 1907, 341)

On the way from thoughts to sentences lie states of consciousness that formally anticipate (*präsumieren*) the sentence or framework of sentences (*Satzgefüge*). We become aware of grammatical rules themselves when we are uncertain how to use them or when we or others are guilty of breaking them. *Sprachgefühl* announces itself, injured or satisfied, in particular experiences. We are aware of all this in many different ways in rule-awareness. (Bühler 1907, 341)

Needless to say the syntactic schema to which Bühler here alludes, like their more recent theoretical counterparts, would have been regarded as items of mentalist mythology by Wittgenstein.

Where seeing as has attracted philosophical interest the interest has concentrated on sudden or dramatic Gestalt switches. Indeed Wittgenstein's own interest in the phenomenon goes back to the *Tractatus* which (as David Bell has pointed out to me) is amongst many other things an attempt to bring about a switch of aspect in the reader and which also contains a brief description of different ways of seeing the Necker cube (Hallett suggests that the position of this discussion at TLP 5.5423 throws light on the position of the discussion of aspect seeing in the second half of the *Investigations*). And it is of course arguable that the ideal reader of the *Investigations* is one who regularly experiences a jolt on coming to appreciate Wittgenstein's subtle variations on his examples. Contemporary interest in the phenomenon is often linked to its role in explaining the dramatic emergence of theory-laden seeing.¹⁰

In spite of the intrinsic interest of the phenomenon of sudden aspect switches neither Wittgenstein nor his predecessors were interested in the phenomenon merely for its own sake. Their aim was, first, to understand what Wittgenstein calls »continuous aspect seeing«, (PI II, xi, 194, 201), and Meinong and Linke »assimilative perception«. The discussions of Gestalt ambiguity by Benussi and Witasek were undertaken in order to understand Gestalt perception. And, secondly, their aim was to understand the relation between, on the one hand, perceptual switches and continuous seeing, and on the other hand, related non-

perceptual phenomena. One of Wittgenstein's reasons for studying non-continuous seeing as was its close relation to the idea of experiencing the meaning of a word. Both belong to a wide ranging group of similar psychological phenomena. (RPP I, § 358) Some indication of the variety of phenomena Wittgenstein had in mind is given by the *Brown Book*. For Bühler, too, it is the similarity between such experiences and noticing aspects that is important. For in these cases experience and thought combine in ways that show up traditional conceptions of the sensory and the intellectual as oversimplified. We have looked in some detail at what is peculiar to sudden switches of aspect. Let us now look at both sudden and continuous aspect perception paying especial attention to the question of their relation to one another.

The accounts of continuous and non-continuous seeing given by Linke and Wittgenstein fall in the middle of a theoretical continuum. At one extreme we have the theories of the Berlin Gestalt psychologists - Wertheimer, Köhler and Koffka - and at the other extreme the early theories of Meinong and his pupils. The common problem they address themselves to is the nature of aspect switches, the nature of the transformation (*Verwandlung*, Linke 1929, 266), of the new phenomenon that occurs in seeing as:

When the switch occurs in the case of a new figure there really arises a *new* phenomenon. One feels this very clearly in the surprise one experiences even when one has previously exactly considered just how the new phenomenon is likely to look. (Koffka 1922, 384)

The Berlin solution is that we have to do here with a sensory change, the Graz solution is that we have here an intellectual change. Linke and Wittgenstein suggest that the change involved is in some respects a sensory change and in others an intellectual change.

Köhler's view is that

in most visual fields the contents of particular areas »belong together« as circumscribed units from which their surroundings are excluded»; this organisation of the visual field is a »sensory fact«. (GP 1947, 137)

Sensory units have acquired names, have become richly symbolic, and are now to have certain practical uses, while nevertheless they have existed as units before any of these further facts were added. Gestalt psychology claims that it is precisely the original segregation of circumscribed wholes which makes it possible for the sensory world to appear so utterly imbued with meaning to the adult; for, in its gradual entrance into the sensory field, meaning follows the lines drawn by natural organization; it usually enters into segregated wholes. (GP ch. V, 139)¹²

Köhler's position is an extreme one. At the other extreme we find the position of Meinong, Witasek and Benussi. On their view the difference between simple perception and Gestalt perception is precisely that Gestalten, and hence the passage from observing one Gestalt to noticing a second one, correspond to no sensory stimuli and are therefore not sensory phenomena. They therefore argued that Gestalten are higher order objects, produced by unconscious mental activity. The Berlin view that aspect switches, in particular changes in aspects of organisation, are sensory changes is explicitly rejected by both Wittgenstein and

Linke. And the Austrian identification of aspect switches with intellectual changes is subtly modified by Linke to yield an account that is very close to that given by Wittgenstein.¹³

For Benussi the mere fact that nothing changes in the object I am looking at when I notice a change in its aspects of organisation, that there are no corresponding changes of stimuli as there are for the colours and shapes of the object, rules out the possibility of any sensory change. In the case of Gestalt ambiguity »the totality of what makes itself felt internally by means of the eye does not univocally determine...the objects which are grasped«. (Benussi 1914, 399)

Wittgenstein argues in a similar way (LW, § 503) that organisation is not on the same level as colours and shapes, nor a fortiori are the aspects involved in conceptual aspect seeings.

The colour of the visual impression corresponds to the colour of the object (this blotting paper looks pink to me and is pink)- the shape of the visual impression to the shape of the object (it looks rectangular to me, and is rectangular)-but what I perceive in the dawning of an aspect is not a property of the object, but an internal relation between it and other objects. (PI II, xi, 212)

Think of the expression »I heard a plaintive melody! And now the question is: »Does he hear the plaint?« (LW, § 742; cf. PI II, xi, 209)

And if I reply: »No, he doesn't hear it; he (merely) senses it« - where does that get us? One cannot mention a sense-organ for this »sensation«. (LW, § 743)

As Linke puts it, we can distinguish between the red experience and the quality of redness but there is no such thing as a mountain experience in this sense of »experience«. (Linke 1929, 290-291)

On Linke's account seeing as involves *Vorstellungen*. (I shall continue to use the German term here, since »image« is grossly misleading in all those cases where the word is intended to capture a cognitive event.) Wittgenstein makes a related point at PI II, xi, 213 where he says the concept of seeing is *akin* to that of a *Vorstellung*. In a remark that, as Schulte suggests, may be directed against the second passage from Köhler just quoted, Wittgenstein writes »It is - contrary to Köhler - precisely a *meaning* (*Bedeutung*) that I see (RPP I, § 869)«. In his development of ideas of Bühler, Brunswik describes how, on the Berlin view, stimuli stand by themselves »and not as meaning laden indices of other objects«. ¹⁴

The fact that *Vorstellungen* are not perceptions does not mean that they have private objects:

If you put the 'organization' of a visual impression on a level with colours and shapes, you are proceeding from the idea of the visual impression as an inner object. (PI II, xi, 196; LW, § 443)

The aspect *seems* to belong to the structure of the inner materialisation. (LW, § 482)

If the aspect is a kind of organisation and if the organisation can be compared to the characteristics of shape and colour, then the change of aspect is like a change of apparent colour. (LW, § 448)

As Linke puts it, the object of any *Vorstellung* is not *erlebnishaft*, but *erlebnisfremd* (Linke 1929, 291). It is an »exemplar of a kind« and obeys the same es-

sential laws as any other exemplar of this kind. The telephone that is the object of my *Vorstellung* in an assimilative perception is the same object that is designed by and installed by engineers and so on. As Wittgenstein puts it, in the dawning of an aspect what I perceive is not a property of the object but an internal relation between it and other objects. (PI II, xi, 212)

A more important group of considerations comes into focus if we ask, with Benussi, Linke and Wittgenstein, whether the *Vorstellungen* involved in noticing aspects involve interpretation. (Budd 1987, 11 discusses the relation between interpretation and thinking for Wittgenstein and criticises his use of the former concept.) Their answer is negative. As Linke puts it: If we are to speak of interpretation (*Deutung*) here we must immediately add that what is involved is *urteilsfremde Deutung*, interpretation to which all judgement is foreign. I may feel, he says, that I have to see a certain ordering of points as a triangle. But I do not judge this to be the case; indeed I may even be convinced that it does not really have any of the properties of a triangle (Linke 1929/1918, § 109). As Wittgenstein puts it:

If we say »I see this figure as an F« there isn't any verification or falsification for that, just as there isn't for »I see a luminous red«. (RPP I, § 8; cf. RPP II, § 547)

What we have here, in a rudimentary form, is the distinction developed by Husserl, Benussi, Hazay and Scheler between the perceptual mode of taking something to be actual and the judgemental mode of taking something to be the case, and hence the distinction between *Täuschung* (delusion, illusion) and error. I may see one of two lines as longer than the other even though I know that they are the same length (the Brentano-Müller-Lyer illusion).¹⁵

If seeing as is not any sort of genuine judgement and so resembles first person reports about what I see its not being a judgement may be rooted in the fact that it is subject to the will, a point stressed by Benussi, Wittgenstein and Linke. »The aspect is subject to the will« (RPP II, § 544). As Linke points out an aspect may force itself on me, but it makes sense to try and resist it.¹⁶ As the Brentanists liked to point out, one cannot get out of what is subject to the will any more than one puts into it. *Vorstellungen* alone, like imagination, teach us nothing about the external world (RPP I, § 899). They differ then in this respect from simple, purely sensorial seeing and from judgement which are not subject to the will.

In the best traditions of descriptive psychology Linke develops a structural and componential account of the complex experience of seeing as. It involves a sensory component - simple seeing - and a non-sensory component, a *Vorstellung*. These hang together in two ways. First, the *Vorstellung* depends on the simple, sensory seeing. Wittgenstein mentions a related account:

The aspects of the triangle: It is as though an *image/presentation* (*Vorstellung*) came into contact with the visual impression and remained in contact with it for a time. (PI II, xi, 207)

The concept of an aspect is related to the concept of *Vorstellung*. Or: the concept 'I see that now as ...' is related to 'I now imagine that'. (PI II, xi, 213)

We might explain how something can be seen in different ways by saying that the aspect comes about through different *Vorstellungen* and memories superimposed on the optical image. Naturally this explanation interests me not as an explanation but as a logical possibility, hence conceptually (mathematically). (RPP I, § 1005)

Secondly, these two mental states are part of a non-summative whole, the state of assimilative perception. Linke puts the point by saying that the experience of seeing as, although it contains something which is not a seeing, resembles seeing more than it does imagining. The mode of the state of seeing as is like the mode of seeing. The object of this attitude has the character of actuality (another difference between seeing as and judging). Seeing as *inherits* from its genuine perceptual component the character of a perception.

Assimilative perception is perception of a whole, which is only *genuinely* perceived in part: as far as its remaining part (i.e. certain moments belonging to it) is concerned, it is merely imagined; but what is imagined participates in the immediate suggestion of reality (*Wirklichkeits-suggestion*) of what is perceived in a peculiar way, such that the whole exhibits the same »sensorily« compelling character of the genuine perception. (Linke 1929, 237; cf. 234, 262)

Seeing as and simple seeing are both states in which we find ourselves not acts (RPP II, § 43). Does this not contradict the claim that *Vorstellungen* are subject to the will? No, for at least two reasons. A particular way of seeing as will often force itself on me, as Linke puts it, but I can try and perhaps fail to see differently (cf. Budd 1987, 14). Also, a *Vorstellung* in an experience of seeing as does not behave like an isolated *Vorstellung* i.e. imagining.

Although Linke's positive thesis, that seeing as and its object are structured wholes, is foreign to Wittgenstein he does emphasise the correlative negative thesis: seeing as is not any mere sum or addition of experiences (BB, 168). And at PI II, xi, 213 we read

Doesn't it take imagination to hear something as a variation on a particular theme? And yet one is perceiving something in so hearing it. (PI II, xi, 213)

»To me it is an animal pierced by an arrow«. That is what I treat it as; this is my *attitude* (*Einstellung*) to the figure. This is one meaning in calling it a case of »seeing«. (PI II, xi)¹⁷

Linke's account of assimilative perception had been briefly sketched by Meinong in 1888. When, for example, different people see one and the same thing »with different eyes« then, writes Meinong, we should not describe the different types of assimilation involved as a type of association, what we have is rather »a complex of elements of presentation, which are in part perceptual and in part imaginative but which as a whole is taken as a complex of sensations, that is of perceptual presentations«. (Meinong 1969, 147) This thesis was also accepted by Benussi who frequently pointed out that noticing aspects of organisation involves the »sensory freshness and intuitiveness of what is given in genuine sense perception«. Unfortunately the Grazer often combined this claim with the theses that the non-sensory object of seeing as was brought about by an act of unconscious production and that to see is to judge. Linke's merit is to have rejected these two claims so bringing out the intermediate position of seeing as between simple seeing and thinking. (cf. RPP II, 390)

Linke's account of suddenly seeing a new aspect is presented in the course of his account of continuous assimilative perception. Wittgenstein concentrates mainly on sudden aspect switches. What is the relation between aspect switches and continuous seeing of aspects? In the remainder of this paper I should like to examine the thesis that what I above called simple seeing and epistemic seeing is normally nothing other than continuous seeing of aspects. Continuous seeing of aspects is what goes on before and after each of the transitions described under (1) - (10) above. Any such continuous perception, the normal description of which would employ a perceptual verb and a nominal or propositional complement, *can* be described as »I see *a* as an *n*«. This does not of course mean that my perception of e.g. a car can be described as »I see *this* car as a car« but that it can be described as »I see this as a car«. In ordinary continuous perception the sensory and non-sensory components of the perceptual state are phenomenally indistinguishable or fused with one another, they are experienced as distinct but not independent of one another in aspect switches. At least three different cases can occur: the case where the second argument of »seeing as« is a bare deictic expression, the case where the deictic expression is combined with a description of an object that employs only spatial and colour terms or some richer description. And finally the common, slightly more complicated case, where I say »I saw this as a duck and now I see it as a rabbit«. In this case the switch of the non-sensory aspects makes me aware of the distinction between the sensory component and the non-sensory components of what I see.

The thesis that normal perception involves aspects will become a little clearer if we look at the case where Hans sees that Sam is amused. The accounts given of such cases by Husserl, Scheler, Bühler (e.g. 1929, 99-104) and Wittgenstein all rest on accounts of criterial connexions that complement the accounts of seeing as already looked at. The central link between Austrian accounts of continuous seeing as and accounts of criteria is that perception of the criteria for *x* and awareness of *x* are indistinguishable features of a unified mental state.¹⁸

To see that Sam is amused is one experience, but a complex experience and the object or state of affairs seen has a corresponding complexity. Wittgenstein points out that when we see someone who has fallen into a fire and cries out we do not distinguish between his pain and his behaviour (NPESD). As Husserl puts it: »Common speech credits us with perceptions even of other people's inner experiences; we 'see' their anger, their pain etc. Such talk is quite correct as long as, e.g., we allow outward bodily things likewise to count as perceived«. (LI I, § 7) The unity of what is seen in such cases is positively described in terms of a metaphor, Hans sees Sam's amusement, his amusement aspect *through* his (sensory) perception of Sam (Sam's shape). This metaphor blocks a theory that is rejected in all Austro-German accounts of criteria according to which Sam's amusement is standardly *inferred*.

Of course, if I am to grasp someone else's experience then objectively speaking the gesture or sound have to be there and excite my eye and ear etc. But it is an illusion ... to think that I must therefore see a bodily movement or indeed a »foreign body« before I can understand, on the basis of this perception of a bodily movement, e.g. of a face distorted by laughter, someone's joy. Only when I expect a case of malingering or in the case of very strange modes of expression, e.g. those of a foreign people or of strange animals, do I grasp the bodily gestures as such before their interpretation. The qualities, lines and forms that present themselves to me are not normally given to me in such a way that I am first aware of them as symbols of a body in motion (e.g. raised, joined hands as symbols of a request); rather, I immediately see in and through these qualities, lines and forms the »joy«, the »request«. (Scheler 1911, 146-147)¹⁹

»I noticed he was out of humour«. Is that a report about his behaviour or his state of mind? ... Both; not side-by-side, however, but about the one via (*durch*, through) the other. (PI II, v, cf. iv; Z, 220, 225)

It seems likely that there is no *theory* of criteria behind Wittgenstein's use of this notion in the *Blue Book* (p. 24f.) and the *Investigations* (PI, §§ 78, 354-5; Z, *passim*). Although, like many key Wittgensteinian concepts it has given rise to a number of theories in which it has been applied and also to arguments about whether it has any theoretical role to play (in Wittgenstein or in an anti-realist theory of meaning).

It is, however, quite certain that the descriptive psychologists were in search of a theory; as Bühler puts it: »A theory of criteria must be constructed«. (Bühler 1930, 401; first edition 1918) As Bühler was well aware, elements of such a theory had been developed by earlier descriptive psychologists, in particular Husserl (Bühler 1923, 290), under the heading of a theory of indices and motivation (*Anzeichen, Motivierungszusammenhänge*).²⁰

The »general schema« of a theory of criteria, writes Bühler, »will have to contain the specific marks of the genesis of judgements, of the phenomena that accompany them and of their effects«. (Bühler 1930, 401) The different types of judgement for which a criterial account is given, by Husserl, Bühler and Wittgenstein are: judgements of memory, perceptual judgements and judgements about the mental states of others.²¹

Husserl, Bühler and Wittgenstein all agree on the following traits of the criterial relation: it is defeasible (LU I, § 3); it yields certainty (PI II, 224);²² it is not any kind of logical relation (*ibid.*, PI, § 183) because it is a context dependent relation (LI I, § 2); it is not any kind of probabilistic relation (LI I, § 3; Z, § 554); criteria can vary and even conflict (the example Husserl gives at LI I, § 3 is an example of what Wittgenstein was later to call a »symptom« rather than a criterion). On one further important point Bühler and Wittgenstein adopt a position different from that of Husserl. In a sense of the word that has, notoriously, never been made quite clear, Wittgenstein talks of »defining criteria« (BB, 25; AWL, 28f.; Z, § 438; RFM, 139) in contexts where he seems to claim that criteria contribute to the sense of the related terms. The problem is to specify the nature of this contribution without drawing on, for example, a relation of logical consequence. Bühler, too, though familiar with Husserl's claim that indication falls

short of the strength of a logical relation (1929, 131-32) frequently argues that criterial connexions do after all have the status of logical links (Bühler 1929, 132; 1930, 373); there are, he thinks, criteria that are »sufficient« for that of which they are criteria (Bühler 1930, 402). On one final point none of our three criteriologists is consistent. Does the general distinction drawn above between seeing and judging apply to our perception of others? Is Hans' seeing that Sam is amused a judgement to the same effect or is it merely such as to be capable of sustaining such a judgement? Husserl draws the distinction clearly at LI I, § 7 but like Bühler and Wittgenstein often forgets it. Linke, however, is surely right to remind us that a 'happy' face can remain happy for me even though I know that the person I am looking at is not really happy. (Linke 1929, 263)

A thorough-going distinction between non-conceptual seeing and judging has, of course, a number of implications concerning the existence of »logical« links between the terms of the criterial relation.²³ Husserl's refusal to countenance any dependence relation between Hans' perception of Sam (or his shape) and his perception of Hans' aspect of amusement is perhaps due to the fact that he has an alternative account at hand. The relation of motivation between indices and what they indicate is not, he says, any sort of necessary relation (LU I, § 3). What Hans sees is a complex whole, the parts of which are dependent on another *qua* parts of this whole.

[W]e feel the connexion forcing itself upon us. To turn mere coexistence into mutual pertinence or, more precisely, to build cases of the former into intentional unities of things which seem mutually pertinent is the constant result of associative functioning. (LU I, § 4)

Of these and other such unities Husserl writes that they modify their parts and bring about »a certain change of character« in them (LU VI, § 9). A direct consequence of this view is that the fact that Hans sees that Sam is amused does not imply that Hans sees Sam. The first perception contains only a modified version of the latter. An analogous case is the assertion that Sam is happy, which does not contain the assertion that Sam exists.²⁴ Thus one of the premisses of the erroneous view that Hans infers to Sam's state on the basis of an independent perception of Sam is blocked.

Perception of the psychological aspects of others, like all continuous seeing of aspects, involves fusion (cf. LI VI, § 10), in particular of what is sensory and of what is not sensory. So, too, does a switch of aspects, but in such a case part of what is normally indistinct because fused becomes distinct (cf. RPP I, § 27). Thus Hans becomes aware that this, which he had seen as a woman, he now sees as a man. This is the view of the descriptive psychologists working in the Brentanian tradition, a view whose attraction Wittgenstein seems to have felt, a temptation he tried to avoid:

Now, when I recognise my acquaintance in a crowd, perhaps after looking in his direction for quite a while, - is this a special sort of seeing? Is it a case of both seeing and thinking? or a fusion of the two, as I should almost like to say?

The question is: *why* does one want to say this? (PI II, xi, 197)

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Notes

*For Cesare Musatti in his 91st year.

- 1 »I imagine-seeing...« does not mean »I imagine that I see ...«; cf. Vendler 1984, ch III; on modification, cf. Mulligan 1987, § 6).
- 2 Wittgenstein does, however, accept one type of relation between modes dear to the descriptive psychologists - the dependence of occurrent emotions on thought and perception - cf. RPP II, § 153.
- 3 Bühler explores the parallels between his account of rule-awareness and Kant's theory of the schematism. (Bühler 1907, 342) In this connexion it is interesting to note Cavell's use of the notion of »grammatical schematism« in his Wittgenstein commentary. (Cavell 1979, 77) On Wittgenstein and Kant's schematism see also Bell 1987, § 7. - More promising than any parallel with Kant is Bühler's point that his account of rule awareness deals with the same problems Husserl had discussed in LI under the heading of »categorical intuition« and points the way to a revision of Husserl's account of verification, a revision whose necessity Husserl was later to concede (Bühler 1907, 340; Bühler discusses rule-awareness also at Bühler 1909, 116f.).
- 4 On the taxonomies of noticing (*Bemerken*) and attending (*Aufmerken*) in Brentano and Wittgenstein see Mulligan & Smith 1985.
- 5 Here as elsewhere Wittgenstein reduces and assimilates the variety of internal distinctions and links - conceptual, ontological, psychological - described by the descriptive psychologists to the level of grammar. On dispositions vs occurrences see Meinong 1919; on this, see Mulligan 1989. On the three-way distinction, first described by Meinong, between dispositions, their bases and their manifestations, see *Wittgenstein's Lectures 1932-35*, 1979, 90ff. Kraus (1927, 325) gives an interesting account of the genesis of habits, dispositions and of Aha experiences in terms of changes in the »real bases« underlying dispositions.
- 6 Mulhall 1987 contains an extended discussion of the relation between the primary/secondary meaning distinction and seeing as.
- 7 Cf. Wittgenstein in this section on James' »if feeling« and the possibility of an if-gesture with Bühler's amusing discussion of behaviour that is »wennisch« or »dochig«. (Bühler 1930, 415ff.) Meinong suggests at 1977, 29, 209, 405 that talk about if and but involves secondary meaning. Contrast this account with LI VI, § 43, §§ 54-56. Unlike Husserl, Meinong thinks that logical form shows itself in a secondary sense. - Husserl's distinction between familiarity and meaning is set out at LI I, § 21; on the non-sensorial character of meaning, see LI I, §§ 17-20.
- 8 Cf. Messer 1928, 102-104; Bühler 1908: »We can understand sentences without subsequently being able to mention any contents of consciousness bound up with this ... awareness of meaning is never completely exhausted by the *Vorstellungen* one experiences and notices« (115); Reinach 1982, and on Reinach the papers by Smith and Mulligan in Mulligan (ed) 1987. Notice that the vague awareness of the sphere to which a word derives from the fact that concepts have a place (*Platz*) in concept trees - a fact stressed by Husserl, Wittgenstein (particularly in the first half of the *Investigations*) and Bühler, who speaks in this connexion of *Platzbestimmungen*.

- 9 »Bedeutungsblindheit« and »Seelenblindheit« occur at Mauthner *Beiträge zu einer Kritik der Sprache*, Band I, 309, the former also occurs at Mach *Erkenntnis und Irrtum*, 45, the latter in the second chapter of James' *Principles* - as Schulte (1987, 71- 72) points out.
- 10 A role first described by Fleck in his monograph of 1935. (Fleck 1935, 121; cf. Schnelle 1982, 252ff.) Wertheimer (1920, reprinted in 1925, 176, 180 and 1945) describes how *Umzentrierung* or re-centering and aspect switches are often necessary in order to solve problems and make inferences.
- 11 *Terminology*: The expression »assimilative perception«, which has scholastic roots (Campanella), seems to have been coined by Wundt, who used it merely to describe simultaneous association between like elements (Wundt 1893, 438ff). Uses of the term that are closer to the way it is used within the tradition of descriptive psychology are to be found in Ward's 1893, 1894 articles in *Mind*. Perhaps its first use within descriptive psychology, where it refers to a non-associative conception of perception, is in Meinong 1888 (now in Meinong 1969, GA I, 147). Köhler uses the concept of »assimilation« e.g. at Köhler 1947, 219, 86-88. Cf. also Musatti 1931. Wittgenstein uses the term at LW I, § 712 in the course of a discussion of assimilated gestures. Wittgenstein's terms »Aufpassen« and »Deuten« are used by Husserl and Linke. Husserl writes in the *Investigations*.

The same sensational contents are »taken« now in this, and now in that manner [in the first edition of LI Husserl had written »interpret«] ... Whatever the origin of the experienced contents in present in consciousness, it is conceivable that the same sensational contents should be present with a differing interpretation, in other words that the same contents should serve to ground perceptions of different objects. (LI V, § 14)

One of Linke's aims in *Grundfragen der Wahrnehmungslehre* is to restate Husserl's account of »interpretation« without appealing, as Husserl does here, to the »constancy hypothesis«. Wittgenstein's systematic use of the term »seeing as« seems to be peculiar to him. His use of »Aspekt« should not be confused with Meinong's use of the same word or Russell's »aspect«; in these two cases the word means something like »sensible profile«. Wittgenstein's »Aspekt« is, however, close in meaning to the »Momente« of Linke, except that for Linke as for other heirs of Brentano »Momente« were accorded a definite ontological status - the status of abstract particulars. Of the two major alternative conceptual approaches to Gestalt phenomena, that inaugurated by Ehrenfels according to which we see Gestalt *qualities* and that associated with the Berlin school, according to which we see structured wholes, Wittgenstein's talk of seeing aspects resembles the former more than the latter.

- 12 The first passage is quoted by Budd (1987, 5), the second by Schulte (1987, 86).
- 13 It is perhaps worth pointing out that Wittgenstein's polemical remarks about psychology often bear on just those points on which the Berlin psychologist-philosophers differed from their teachers and from their contemporaries in Graz; I am thinking in particular of the way they deliberately muddled the sharp distinction between descriptive and genetic psychology. Cf. »since psychological analysis in the old sense is impossible, so too is pure psychological theory impossible; in order to give an intelligible description of the entire situation one must take the stimuli into account, if one wants to explain one must take into account the domain of physiology« (Köhler 1920, 117, cf. also the closely argued Koffka 1922). Wittgenstein of course also thought that psychological analysis was impossible, but his grammar of psychological concepts very often merely reproduces in a simplified fashion the »essentials«

laws and distinctions of descriptive psychology. - I am also thinking of the Berlin psychologists view of psychology as a »young science« (Köhler 1933, 169) and of their physicalism.

- 14 Brunswik 1934, 228, cf. 93, 117, 135, 141 and Bühler 1929, 131. Brunswik's criticisms are set out in the context of a *critical* theory of perception.

- 15 Meinong could not make this distinction since he took seeing to be a judging. Hazay (1913) is the first explicit modification of Meinong's original account of mental modes or attitudes that allows for this case. Hazay assumes that all seeing is seeing that and classifies as follows:

judging	+ yes/no	+ conviction
assuming	+ yes/no	- conviction
perception	- yes/no	+ conviction

On Benussi's development in this direction, see Stucchi 1989. Husserl in LI had already distinguished between perceptual and cognitive »positing acts« and, unlike Hazay, allowed these to be either simple or propositional. Cf. also Evans 1982, 123.

- 16 Linke 1929, 223. Cf. 259, 224, 239, 233; Linke points to the class of Kandinsky pseudo-hallucinations as a counter-example to the general thesis that *Vorstellungen* are subject to the will.

- 17 The notion of an attitude or set was the focus for one of the most important disagreements about the nature of *Gestalten*. The Berlin School of Gestalt theory claimed that the sharp distinction made by the Grazer School between sensory objects and higher order objects such as arrangements of marks overlooked the fact that a sensory object is a sensory object only with respect to the set or attitude of a perceiver (Koffka 1915, 33ff.; and on this see Smith 1988, 38ff.). Yet differences between attitudes were not understood by the Berliner as differences between psychological modes. Thus Koffka in his review of Linke's book is happy to accept Linke's distinction between the sensory and the non-sensory components of the object of an assimilative perception but not his distinction between the corresponding experiences. Cf. Wittgenstein's discussion of attitudes at Z, § 204ff.

- 18 The development of an account of criteria went hand in hand with the development of the view that the link between mental states and behaviour is not purely contingent, or as Bühler puts it, that »de facto the experiential and the behavioural aspect are indissolubly intertwined (*unaufhebbar verflochten*). A puzzle if one will, but one that the facts present us with« (Bühler 1929, 101). Cf. Höfler 1897, § 78; Höfler 1930, § 4, § 21; Köhler 1933, 157; Wertheimer 1925, 21; cf. Köhler 1947, 236, and Wittgenstein LW I, § 584; PI, § 142, § 571.

- 19 The second edition of this article (1915, reprinted in GW, Bd. 3, 1972, refers to similarities between Scheler's claims and those developed in Wertheimer 1912, cf. Scheler 1972, 278-280).

- 20 Bühler often uses »symptom« as a synonym of »criterion«, noting only occasionally that the two concepts can be distinguished. His most systematic account of criteria, in Bühler 1930, §§ 29-31, is indebted to G. E. Müller's criterial account of memory.

- 21 On criteria in simple sensory perception, cf. LU I, § 4, § 7; WWK; PhB; PI II, viii; Brunswik 1934. On criteria and memory, cf. Bühler 1930, §§ 29-31; Gallinger 1914 (a monograph influenced by both Husserl and Müller); PI, § 56; RPP I, § 684; on Wittgenstein on memory, see Schulte 1987, ch. 7. On the criteria for imagination see Segal 1916, 350ff., 365, 409, a work by a Polish pupil of Bühler's. Meinong's account of »evident suppositions« in his 1886 theory

of memory and elsewhere is closely related to accounts of criteria given by other heirs of Brentano. See too his discussion of the principle that if nothing contradicts my memories they are certain at GA VI, 619.

- 22 Such certainty, perceptual or judicative, is for Husserl uniform. Wittgenstein's official scepticism about the uniformity of modes and attitudes is much less prominent when he describes the certainty that attaches to criteria.
- 23 On Husserl's account of the relation between perception and judgement see Mulligan & Smith 1986. There are interesting similarities between Husserl's accounts of complex, non-judgemental seeing that and criteria and the position McDowell attributes to Wittgenstein in McDowell 1982.
- 24 Wittgenstein mentions the »modified concept of sensing« that seeing as involves at PI II, xi, 209.- Husserl's rejection of necessary relations between indices and what they indicate at the phenomenal level is compatible with the view that the corresponding concepts are related to one another in non-contingent ways. Indeed one of the central theses of LU VI is that sentences get their senses from what verifies them. On Husserl's own premisses, therefore, it would be plausible to assert that e.g. »pain« gets part of its sense from its use in sentences that are verified by perceptions of Sam's pain via, or through perceptions of Sam. In this connexion it is worth noticing that Husserl, and in his wake Scheler and Geiger, argued against Brentano that attributions of psychological concepts both to oneself and to others are thoroughly corrigible.