SUSAN F. KRANTZ

Brentano's Arguments Against Aristotle for the Immateriality of the Soul

In his *Theory of Categories*,[1] Brentano tells us:

> I have said that our self appears to us as a mental substance. I now add that it appears to us as a pure[ly] mental substance. It does not appear, say, as a substance which is mental with respect to one part and which is corporeal, and thus extended in three dimensions, with respect to another part. I emphasize this expressly, for the contrary has been asserted by important philosophers – for example, by Aristotle in ancient times and by many present-day thinkers who have been influenced by his opinion.[2]

Thus he rejects what he elsewhere refers to as the semi-materialism of Aristotle (and of Plato).[3] In what follows, I shall first examine the Aristotelian conception of the soul as Brentano understood it. Then I shall discuss the difficulties Brentano saw in the Aristotelian conception, from the point of view of Brentano's reism. Finally, I shall present what I take to be Brentano's conception of the soul as it appears from a reistic interpretation of his analyses of the *act* of sensation and of the *subject* of sensation.[4] My purpose is to shed some light on the reistic ontology that may be taken to underlie Brentano's psychology.

I. The Aristotelian View

Aristotle's psychology is of course too vast a subject to be treated adequately within the scope of this paper. But for present purposes, the focus with respect to Aristotle may be narrowed on two points. First, my intention is only to discuss what Brentano took Aristotle to be saying about the nature of the soul, and not to determine whether he read Aristotle rightly. Second, I shall concentrate mainly on what Aristotle called the sensitive soul, since this is where the issue of the soul's corporeality becomes important.[5]

In his *Psychology of Aristotle*,[6] Brentano attributes to Aristotle three proofs that the sensitive soul is embodied, that is, that it »has the ensouled body as its subject,« or that the soul is in a material body as in a subject.

The first proof appeals to the fact that some animals, when divided into two parts, undergo regeneration such that two animals come to be from what was originally one animal. This would seem to show that when the animal's body is divided its soul is also multiplied by two. Since an immaterial entity could not be thus divided, it follows that the soul is not an independent immaterial entity, but exists in a material body as in a subject.

Brentano Studien 1 (1988), 63-74

The second proof is based on the corruptibility of the sense powers. Sight and hearing, for example, can be damaged by visible and audible objects which are too intense. By contrast, this does not happen to the intellectual power, which is rather perfected by objects that are, so to say, too intelligible. Therefore the subject of the sense powers must be an ensouled body and not an independent, immaterial entity.

Finally, what Brentano calls the »proper, apodictic proof« proceeds from the nature of the act of sensation. A sense power is ordered to its proper object; that is to say, sight is characterized by the capacity to be affected by the visible, hearing by the audible, touch by the tangible, and so on. These capacities must be so proportioned to their objects as to receive them adequately, and this means that they must occupy, so to say, a middle ground with respect to the object in question. Thus sight is most suited to receive and to enjoy visible objects within a certain range of visibility, but is injured or insufficiently stimulated by objects that are either too bright or too dim, respectively. Likewise, hearing receives and enjoys audible objects within a certain range of audibility, but is injured by or deaf to sounds that are too loud or too soft. And so on for the other senses. This state of affairs is necessary for sensory discrimination, which naturally involves a range having a mean and extremes. If the organ of sight or of hearing were wholly immaterial, however, it would be of a nature superior to, rather than proportioned to, that which admits of a mean and extremes. What is wholly immaterial is not, as such, able to be affected in a physical way. Therefore the subject of sensations like sight and hearing must be, not an independent immaterial entity, but an ensouled body.

Although Aristotle thus believed the organs of sensation to be extended bodies, he did not on that account consider the ultimate subject of sensation to be several different organs. Rather, as Brentano notes, Aristotle thought that,

> the sensitive part is single in its subject; just as the various radii of a circle meet in one center, so the heterogeneous influences of sensory qualities meet finally in a single organ which alone has the special constitution required for sensation.[7]

The various organs of specific sensations, eye, ear, and so forth, serve as instruments for the single organ of sensation as such. And the important point for our purposes is that this latter organ is a body, too. Moreover, »the entire body of the living being belongs to one and the same substance.«[8]

It is useful to recall here Aristotle's well-known definition of the soul as, »the first entelechy of a physical, organic body.«[9] For Aristotle, a living being is one being, even though it is an organized body that has parts, and even though its form or soul also has parts, in a certain sense. The whole ensouled body is one individual, hence one substance, because although it performs several operations -- grows, moves, sees, hears -- yet it acts as one being, and does so in virtue of its having one life principle or soul.

II. Brentano's Objections

Although Brentano was an avid admirer and student of Aristotle, it is safe to say that he was more captivated by some of Aristotle's views than by others. It seems to me that Brentano's reism was inspired in part by a view that Aristotle held concerning the intellectual, as distinct from the sensitive soul: this was Aristotle's doctrine of the immateriality of the intellect. In a sense, Brentano took Aristotle's view several steps further and ended by claiming, not merely that a part of the form of the human being is not in a body as in a subject, but that the entire human soul is a substance in its own right and that it is an immaterial substance. It is interesting to see the change in the concept of substance as a result of this development. For the moment, however, let us consider the reasons which led Brentano to reject Aristotle's semi-materialism.

In the first place, it should be noted that Brentano does not object specifically to Aristotle's use of the materiality of the sensitive soul as an explanation for the divisibility of certain animals. Nor does he take issue with the idea that the senses may be damaged by sensory objects that are too intense. Both of these bits of evidence for the materiality of the subject of sensation may count in favor of Aristotle's theory insofar as they manifest its explanatory power, and Brentano presents Aristotle sympathetically.[10] On the other hand, neither point seems sufficient on Brentano's view to override an argument based on principle. So Brentano's arguments for the immateriality of the sensitive soul must be seen as speaking rather to the »proper, apodictic proof« detailed above.

Brentano's arguments may be seen as directed to the analysis of the act of sensation. What follows is constructed from points made by Brentano in diverse contexts in several sources: *The Theory of Categories, Psychologie III, and Deskriptive Psychologie*. Admittedly, the juxtaposition of these points is convenient to serve my purposes, but it is also intended to capture the spirit of Brentano's disagreement with Aristotle.

First, let us consider Brentano's notion of a psychic accident as opposed to a physical accident, in terms of the underlying substance of each.[11] He agrees with what he takes to be Aristotle's view, that an extended substance cannot be the subject of an unextended accident, and that an unextended substance cannot be the subject of an extended accident. However, rather than concluding from this that the organs, for example, of sight and of hearing must be extended since the objects which affect them are extended, Brentano concludes instead that the organ of sight or of hearing cannot be extended, since it is absurd to say that one accident belongs to a multiplicity of substances. Here he has inserted a premise of his own into the argument, one which was foreign to Aristotle, namely that any physical body, being extended in space, is really a multiplicity of things. The idea is that an extended thing is necessarily a continuity of a certain kind; it is »a collection of unitary things [*Einheiten*] each of which is completely different from all of the others.«[12] Although it is a collection of unitary things, the extended thing has a continuity of contiguous parts. The continuity to be ascribed to

the organ of sight, however, and the continuity to be ascribed to the act of seeing, are not the same. For the latter is a continuity, so to speak, of containment, since the act of seeing may include the same subject (substance) as does a judgment about the act of seeing. This continuity is the unity of consciousness,[13] a reality very different from the unity of a body which is continuous throughout a region of space. But the unity of consciousness is what is chiefly required for an act of seeing. Hence (since it cannot be both) it is a conscious substance and not an extended thing that underlies the act of seeing.

The key to the understanding of Brentano on substances and on extended things is his theory of parts and wholes.[14] For present purposes, the most noteworthy point is that he takes, e.g., the seeing of a particular color to be a one-sidedly detachable proper part of the presentation of the concept of color.[15] This means that for Brentano an act of sensation is strictly speaking a part of an intellectual act (i.e., of the presentation of a concept). As such it is of course impossible that the subject of the act of sensation be other than the subject of the act of forming a general concept. But the act of forming a general concept necessarily has as its subject a thinker, i.e., a mental substance. Thus the subject of the act of sensation must be a mental substance, too. To deny this would be to suggest that it is one entity which sees a specific color, say, and an entirely different entity which abstracts the general concept from this sensation. But this is impossible.

Furthermore, Brentano holds that location in space is the principle of individuation for bodies.[16] Thus the parts of any extended body, since each is in a different place, are in fact themselves primary individuals[17] such that the whole extended body is actually an aggregate. Now an aggregate counts as a thing, or being, or substance, or individual, for Brentano, but it does not count as an ultimate subject or ultimate substance, since it has parts which are primary individuals (substances).[18] Thus no extended body is an ultimate subject. Thus no extended body can be capable of psychic operation, for a psychic operation has a one-sidedly detachable proper part as its ultimate subject. But any extended body admits rather of bilateral separability, at least until the point of the last discriminable location in space is reached; but then it is the location and not a conscious or mental substance which is the one-sidedly detachable ultimate subject.

Finally, Brentano remarks:

> According to some philosophers, the subject of our mental acts and sensations and that of analogous animal activities is something corporeal; if this were true, we could have intuitive presentations of certain accidents of bodies. A careful analysis of mental phenomena, however, proves beyond any doubt that their substantial support is not something spatially extended but is something that is mental.[19]

The ultimate court of appeal for Brentano is always inner perception, since it alone is infallible.[20] But inner perception yields no insight into the nature of the corporeal, as we would have to expect it to do if we perceivers were in fact even partially corporeal beings ourselves. Therefore we know that the subject of psy-

chic phenomena is non-corporeal, immaterial. And Brentano concludes, Aristotle was mistaken.

III. Brentano on the Act of Sensation

Several distinctions remain to be clarified in order to make plain both Brentano's view on Aristotle and Brentano's own theory. These are:

1) internal vs. external perception;
2) elements and object of consciousness;
3) mental vs. physical phenomena;
4) mental vs. physical substance.

I shall discuss the first three of these in this section and the fourth in the final section of this paper. I believe the fourth is most important for an understanding of the ontological implications of Brentano's psychology; the first three are preparatory.

(1) Like Descartes, Brentano insisted that claims about what we seem to perceive are unerring; and like Hume he held that claims about what external things we actually do perceive are subject to error and, in fact, are never more than highly probable. An important source of error is the confusion of internal perception with external perception, e.g., when we imagine that what characterizes the phenomenal experience of color or sound also characterizes the external objects which we regard as being the causes of that experience.[21] In order to avoid such confusions, it is necessary to remember that the directly evident knowledge derived from internal perception is confined to the self as its object.[22] It is also confined to the present moment in time, since memory is not infallible.[23] Thus, though we may infer that some real thing is the cause of our hearing or seeing, we may not conclude with certainty that any particular external object is its cause,[24] for no particular non-psychic object is known with evidence.

(2) The natural course is to infer that some non-psychic object is the cause of a sensation (of sight or of hearing). Nevertheless, Brentano claims:

> It is not correct to say that we are acted upon by the primary object of perception. The primary object is different from the cause of the sensation though its appearance is simultaneous with its cause. Ordinarily in perceiving we are inclined to assume that something is the cause of the sensation and to identify this cause with the primary object. Even after experience has long taught us, in the clearest way possible, that the primary objects cannot exist in reality in the way in which they appear to us, we have great difficulty in freeing ourselves from this illusion.[25]

The primary object of sensation is necessarily a phenomenal object, an immanent object, an appearance (e.g., to the one who sees or hears). It is a presentation, hence an element in an act of consciousness, and not a cause, either of its own being presented or of the larger whole of which it is a part.[26] This larger whole consists of the primary object and a secondary object, from which the

primary object is merely distinguishable (as opposed to being actually detachable), namely the act of seeing or of hearing. In other words, when I hear the sound of a bell, the sound is the primary object of the act of hearing, and this sound may be distinguished conceptually but never actually separated from the act of hearing it. The act of hearing the sound is also, whenever I do hear it, an object of consciousness for me (and this will be so whether I actually notice it, or not). One is aware of hearing when one hears what one hears. As Brentano puts it:

> Each act of consciousness, directed primarily to its given object, is at the same time directed to itself. In the presentation of a color there is at the same time the presentation of this presentation. Even Aristotle held that in the psychic phenomenon itself there is contained the consciousness of the phenomenon.[27]

The act of sensation as a whole, then, has two objects, the primary and the secondary,[28] and is logically divisible along certain lines depending upon the distinctions one wishes to draw. At no point, however, does it include either an external physical object or a known relation to such a determinately known object.

(3) Mental phenomena are thus to be distinguished from physical phenomena, but not along the lines of mental vs. extramental existents. Rather, the distinction between mental and physical phenomena is one that obtains among the objects of consciousness in the following manner: Mental phenomena have intentional inexistence, or the property of being directed to an object, physical phenomena do not; mental phenomena have actual existence, physical phenomena do not.[29] This means that physical phenomena, being immanent objects, and not being known to correspond to any determinately known external objects, provide no basis from which to argue that one who senses must be in part a physical body.

Before proceeding from this point, let us summarize what we may take to be the errors in Aristotle's understanding of the act of sensation, from Brentano's point of view.

In the first place, Aristotle assumed that certain real properties of physical objects are received, in a way, by a person who perceives them. This is not evident. Thus doubt is cast on the ideas that an organ of sensation is known to be proportioned to external objects in some determinate way, and that one who senses does so in virtue of having such an organ as a part.

Secondly, Aristotle seems to have assumed that the external, physical object is the primary object of sensation. This is simply not the case. The primary object of sensation is rather an appearance before the mind, a presentation, an immanent object.

Finally, although Aristotle may have been able to accept the distinction between mental and physical phenomena, at least in part, since he did not reduce the one to the other (he was not a thoroughgoing materialist, for example), still

he failed to note that it is only mental phenomena which have an existence that may be known to us with certainty.

In view of each of these points, it was perhaps inevitable that Aristotle would also err, according to Brentano, in designating the nature of (4) the subject of sensation. We turn now to Brentano's conception of this.

IV. Brentano on the subject of sensation

We noted earlier that the self is for Brentano the only object of the directly evident knowledge to be had from inner perception. Although he denies that this self is, or could be, even in part an extended physical object, Brentano nevertheless refers to it as a »material cause«:

> ...what are we to say when the same person sees and hears simultaneously? What we have here is a modal collective, as it were, and in this case the subject is obviously its material cause in the sense mentioned earlier [i.e., as a substance is the cause of its accidents]. But the hearer as such may yet appear to be in a certain way a material cause of the one who sees and hears at the same time; he is a part of the latter and is thus a preconditon of it and not conditioned by it. He can continue to exist unchanged after the whole has ceased to exist...[30]

Like Aristotle, Brentano sees a need for a »material« in the causal explanation of a being which persists through change. As he says, »material causes are causes of continued existence, and are thus internal causes.«[31] But what this »material« is for Brentano is vastly different from what it is for Aristotle. The difference can be accounted for, I think, by their differing conceptions of »substance.«

We have seen that in the Aristotelian theory, as presented by Brentano, great importance is attached to the project of explaining how the diversely organized and articulated human or animal body senses as a unit. Thus, »the heterogeneous influences of sensory qualities meet finally in a single organ.« And, »the entire body of the living being belongs to one and the same substance.«[32]

For Aristotle, we may conclude, a living substance can be a whole with various parts. Moreover, such a whole is not to be taken as an aggregate. For the fact to be explained is its very acting as a unit, as a single being; whereas in the discussion of the elusive Ship of Theseus, quite the reverse, the unity of being of an aggregate is called into question. This is an important difference. What functions as a unit, the ensouled body, is in Aristotle the underlying subject of sensation; but note that it is so as a whole with diverse and changeable parts.

For Brentano, on the other hand, the ultimate subject of sensation is a one-sidedly detachable proper part of a more complex whole. Thus the ultimate subject is simple; rather than having parts, it is a part.[33] At one point, in discussing substance and accident, Brentano suggests, by way of illustration, that we suppose that an atom could think.[34] This is a telling suggestion. Consider what an impossible assumption it would be for Aristotle, since in order to think the entity would first need to live and to sense, neither of which he would consider

remotely possible for a partless atom. Note, too, that the illustrative atom is really for Brentano an entré into the idea that a thinker is in fact not only partless but dimensionless, immaterial. »Now it is perhaps incorrect to ascribe mental activity to an atom, but there is a non-spatial substance within ourselves.«[35]

One way of explaining the difference between Brentano and Aristotle on this point is to note that Brentano was a mereological essentialist while Aristotle was not. Thus for Brentano, whatever acquires new parts is *ipso facto* a new whole, and so the only thing that can persist through change is the part that is successively a part of several different wholes. Aristotle, on the other hand, seems willing to dispense with perfect continuity of the parts at a certain level of organization of the whole; thus presumably an animal whose body parts change, whether subtly through metabolism or dramatically through amputation, may still be, even strictly speaking, the same animal in virtue of the fact that its »first entelechy« is the same.

Mereological essentialism is important to Brentano, but there is another way to understand the opposition of his analysis of the subject of sensation to Aristote's, namely in light of his development of the concept of »substance.« For the term does not mean at all the same thing for Brentano as it does for Aristotle, though no doubt Brentano got his original inspiration from Aristotle. Briefly put, »substance,« within the context of psychology, is a directly evident phenomenological necessity for Brentano, while for Aristotle it is primarily an empirical reality in need of explanation. I cannot present a full treatment of this difference in approach here, but I shall give a preliminary sketch.

The difference is plain from their points of departure in the analysis of change in the physical world. For Aristotle, physics is the study of *ens mobile*, and involves discussion of matter as the principle of individuation and as the substratum of movement and of change, being receptive of form (e.g., quantity, quality, action and passion). For Brentano, modern physics shows the nature of matter to be largely a mystery, but descriptive psychology (»far in advance of physics«[36]) shows that, e.g., the spatial thing is the subject of the colored thing. We do not know what matter is, but we do know that the spatial thing »can have no further subject.« Hence it is »substance,« with respect, for example, to a color and imparts individuation to a color. Like Aristotle, Brentano sees need to supply a principle of individuation; unlike Aristotle, Brentano takes this principle to be in essence a psychological one, i.e., a principle of discrimination, as in »I mean this red over here, not that red over there.« A location is, however, a principle of individuation of immobile being, so to speak, and not, as in Aristotle, of mobile being.[37] Thus, although in a sense »substance« fills the same slot in the physical realm for Brentano as it does for Aristotle, the term is not thereby to be taken as designating the same concept.

Likewise, in the psychic realm, »substance« is not a univocal term as used by Brentano and by Aristotle. In the first place, Aristotle assumes that a human being is a physical being. But as we have seen, this is impossible for Brentano, at least insofar as a human being is considered as one who senses or as one who

thinks. Secondly, although Aristotle does consider that being as such is a broader category than physical being, he does not include even the intellect of a human being in the category of non-physical being, since the intellect of a human being, as we know it, must be embodied. Thus, in the spirit of Aristotle, Aquinas tells us that the intellectual soul is the »form« of the human body;[38] it is not an independent, immaterial substance complete in species. The only immaterial beings are God and »separated substances,« i.e., angels. Now, presumably Brentano is not telling us that we are already angels. What is he telling us, then? Similar to Aristotle, Brentano considers the »general concept of substance« to include, but not to be confined to, the spatial.[39] There is also the subject revealed by inner perception and known with evidence, the subject of the thinker, judger, desirer, hearer, and so on, that lends unity to all its accidents: »It manifests itself as subject of all these and as something that can itself have no subject.«[40] Substance as immaterial would seem to be logically prior to and, in experience, better known than physical being. This is not the »substance« to which Aristotle had referred, which was in its ordinary sense a physical being (ousia) whose operations needed to be explained. This is »substance« as a logically necessary, simple, immaterial entity whose being explains the perceived unity of its properties (accidents).

V. Conclusion

According to Brentano, then, our self or soul »appears to us as a pure mental substance.« Perhaps some champion of common sense, or even of what Hobbes called »Aristotely,« might be tempted to construct the following skeletal proof of Brentano's view: (1) Every ultimate substance is either a material (spatial) being existing always at just one location or an immaterial (non-spatial) being never existing at any location. (2) My self is an ultimate substance. (3) Therefore my self is either always at just one location or never at any location. (4) But my self is not always at just one location, (I can travel from Frankfurt to Würzburg). (5) Therefore, my self is never at any location, hence my self is immaterial (non-spatial). But surely this is a little too thin to capture and hold the spirit of Brentano's thought; I believe he had something further in mind.

Along with Descartes, Brentano held the view that pain is not in fact spatially located.[41] Descartes used the famous example of phantom pain »in« an amputated foot. Brentano makes the point that there is a common confusion between, (i) the experience of pain, and (ii) a spatial phenomenon located in one of our members; that is to say, there is a confusion between a mental phenomenon (pain) and a physical phenomenon (say, nail in foot). I doubt that Brentano meant he would work on his inner pain, like a good stoic, and leave the merely physical nail in his phenomenal foot. He addresses himself, in the texts I have considered, not to the problem of action, but rather to the problem of what it is that we actually know. We do know many things: that a nail in the foot is not

good; that certain animals, upon being divided, will regenerate and form two animals; that we are not among the animals that are capable of doing this, so we should be careful; that our sense organs can be damaged by a direct gaze at the sun or by the amplified sound systems of certain musicians; that without a brain one cannot think. All of these are true propositions about phenomena; I take Brentano at his word as being a realist.[42] But Brentano was not a naive realist; in my opinion he was rather what is sometimes called a phenomenological realist. I think he would say, when discussing the core of what we can actually know with certainty to be real, ontologically speaking, we must begin with what is evident. This means we must begin with the subject disclosed to us by inner perception, and then perhaps go on from there. As Brentano says it:

> In truth, no one can cease to think himself identical with the individual appearing in memory, nor to regard as himself the future individual attaching to this in its earthly history, nor to take an interest in its fortune and misfortune as being his own. It is equally true that he cannot consistently regard that within himself which thinks and feels as something physical, but must rather see it as something spiritual.[43]

Notes

1 Unless otherwise indicated, references are to Brentano's works in English. Section numbers are provided for ease of comparison with the German texts. For their many helpful criticisms and suggestions regarding an earlier draft of this paper, as well as discussion of the general issues involved, I am indebted to my colleagues in the Philosophy Department at the College of St. Thomas, Professors Gary Atkinson, Harold Austin, Richard Connell, Gregory Coulter, Michael Degnan, J. Hubbard and Thomas D. Sullivan.

2 *Theory of Categories*, trans. Chisholm and Guterman (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff 1981), Part Two, II, D, Section 9, pp.121-122.

3 See *On the Existence of God*, trans. Krantz (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff 1987), Sections 448-451, pp.294-295.

4 Crucial to this discussion is the concept of substance in Brentano, which will be treated in the final section of this paper, under the heading of the subject of sensation. I am indebted to Professor Roderick M. Chisholm for having introduced me some ten years ago to Brentano's thoughts on substance and on one-sided detachability. I am also indebted to Professor Vincent Tomas of Brown University who raised several important questions for me about Brentano's substances.

5 For Aristotle, the soul is divisible into three parts or »souls«, the vegetative, the sensitive and the intellectual. Brentano did not disagree with Aristotle on the immateriality of the intellectual soul. There would be difficulties, on Brentano's reistic view, for the material subject of the vegetative soul, mainly due to a conflict between metabolism and mereological essentialism. In so far as this is of interest to the present discussion, it will be dealt with in terms of the similar problem in the act of sensation.

6 *Psychology of Aristotle*, trans. Rolf George (Berkeley: University of California Press 1977), Book Two, Part III, c., Sections 13-14, pp.65-67.

7 *Ibid.*

8 *Ibid.*; see also note 35, p.213.

9 See *Ibid.*, p.32.

10 This is true not only in the works on Aristotle, but also in other works and when he is arguing against Aristotle. See for example, the so-called psychological proof for the existence of God, in *On the Existence of God*, Sections 445-459, pp.293-299.

11 For this discussion, see *Theory of Categories*, Part Two, II, D, Section 9, p.122, and *On the Existence of God*, Sections 448-450, pp.294-295.

12 *The Theory of Categories*, Part Two, II, D, Section 9, p.122.

13 See *Ibid.*, Section 10, p.123; also *Deskriptive Psychologie*, ed. Chisholm and Baumgartner (Hamburg: Meiner 1982), pp.11-12; and *Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint*, trans. McAllister, Rancurello and Terrell (New York: Humanities Press 1973), Book II, Chapter IV, »On the Unity of Consciousness.«

14 See R. M. Chisholm, *Brentano's Theory of Substance and Accident*, in *Brentano and Meinong Studies* (Humanities Press, 1982).

15 *Deskriptive Psychologie*, p.12.

16 See, for instance, *Theory of Categories*, Part Three, III, Section 7, p.191.

17 This is Chisholm's term for a being which exists in itself and which is not an accident. See »Brentano's Theory of Substance and Accident.« Chisholm there proposes the following definitions as an analysis of Brentano's theory:

D1 x is a proper constituent of y = Df x is a constituent of y, and y is not a constituent of x.

D2 x is an accident of y = Df y is a proper constituent of x, and every proper constituent of x is a constituent of y.

D3 x is a substance = Df x is possibly such that it has an accident, and x is not an accident.

D4 x exists in itself = Df x is possibly such that there is nothing of which it is a proper constituent.

D5 x is a primary individual = Df x exists in itself and is not an accident.

D6 x is a part of y = Df x and y are primary individuals, and x is a constituent of y.

D7 x is an aggregate = Df x is a primary individual which has a primary individual as a proper constituent.

D8 x is an ultimate substance = Df x is a substance which is not an aggregate.

18 Here again I follow Chisholm's analysis.

19 *Theory of Categories*, Part Three, IV, Section 2, p.208.

20 See *Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint*, Book Two, II, Section 6, pp.120-121; also *Psychologie III, Vom Sinnlichen und Noetischen Bewußtsein*, ed. Mayer-Hillebrand (Hamburg: Meiner 1968), p.20.

21 See *Psychologie III*, pp.4-5, and 20-21.

22 *Ibid.*, pp.5-6. Note that we refer here, not to the object of sensation, but to the object of knowledge derived from inner perception.

23 *Loc. Cit.*, and p.15.

24 *Ibid.*, p.13.

25 *Theory of Categories*, Part Three, III, Section 12, p.196.

26 That is to say, it does not produce either itself or the whole of which it is a part.

27 *Deskriptive Psychologie*, p.22. See also pp.20-27.

28 See also, *Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint*, Book Two, II, Sections 8-9, pp.128-129.

29 *Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint*, Book Two, I, Sections 5-8, pp.88-94.

30 *Theory of Categories*, Part Three, III, Section 20, p.202.

31 *Ibid.*, p.203.

32 See above, p.4.

33 Of course, the ultimate subject of mental acts can be complicated, or enriched, by accidents, that is to say, by becoming a proper part of any number of different accidents. Thus Brentano says that, »the whole of thinking activity ... is itself extraordinarily complicated.« See *On the Existence of God*, Section 457, p.298.

34 *Theory of Categories*, Part Two, II, C, Sections 1-4, pp.115-116.

35 *Ibid.*

36 *Theory of Categories*, Part Three, IV, Section 2, p.208.

37 It is true that »this red« may become »this blue,« i.e., it may change. The location, however, is static. If this red moves over there, it is no longer the same individual. In this connection, see H. Windischer, »Franz Brentano und die Scholastik,« in: *Philosophie und Grenzwissenschaften* (Innsbruck: Rauch 1936), Volume VI, Number 6, p.51. As Windischer points out, local motion is always a substantial change for Brentano. In an intriguing footnote, Brentano suggests that if a house should cease to be, its place would remain the same, that »the place changes only if the person himself moves.« See *Theory of Categories*, Part Two, I, C, Section 6, p.92.

38 Although he points out: »A body is not necessary to the intellectual soul by reason of its intellectual operation considered as such, but because of the sensitive power, which requires an organ of equable temperament. Therefore the intellectual soul had to be united to such a body, not to a simple element, or to a mixed body, in which fire was in excess.« See *Summa Theologica*, I, Q 76, art. 4 and 5.

39 *Theory of Categories*, Part Three, III, Section 8,pp.192-193.

40 *Ibid.*

41 See *Psychologie III*, Part One, Chapter 3.

42 See *The Origin of our Knowledge of Right and Wrong*, Supplementary Note, »Ethical Subjectivism«, pp.84-90; also, *The True and the Evident*, Appendix I, »On the General Validity of Truth and the Basic Mistakes in a So-Called 'Phenomenology'«, pp.135-140 (from two letters by Brentano to Husserl). In the first of these letters, Brentano notes that the objective knowledge of truth is »unaffected by the fact that the knower, as a person judging, came into being, is subject to causation, and is dependent upon the particular cerebral organization which he happens to have.«

43 *On the Existence of God*, The Psychological Proof, Section 458, p.298.