Brentano's interest in the theory of categories runs from the beginning to the end of his academic career. The story behind it may conveniently be traced to a well-known remark in the Critique of Pure Reason, where Kant says of Aristotle's categories that »because he had no principle, he snatched them up as they occurred to him«. Hegel and Mill also criticised Aristotle for lack of system. In his Geschichte der Kategorienlehre, Trendelenburg undertook to show that Aristotle's choice was not arbitrary, but that he was guided by grammatical factors. This thesis of the grammatical origin of the categories is plausible, and was developed independently of Trendelenburg in this century by Benveniste and later elaborated by Kahn. But a discovery procedure is not a justification, and Trendelenburg went on to criticise Aristotle. In his doctoral dissertation Von der mannigfachen Bedeutung des Seienden noch Aristoteles, written under Trendelenburg, Brentano defended Aristotle against this and other criticisms, and tried to show that one could indeed give a principled defence of Aristotle's choice. The results may best be summarized in the table Brentano himself drew and which he called the »family tree« of the categories:

```
being
  
substance  accidents
  
modifications  relation
     
inherences  changes  circumstances
       
quality  quantity  doing  undergoing  where  when
```
It was Brentano’s view that the table of categories (in the final form with eight rather than the original ten) represented a complete catalogue of ways in which something could be predicated of a first substance, given certain other doctrines of Aristotle, such as the form/matter distinction, the ways in which substances act on one another, and his views on spatial and temporal determinations. If this does not constitute a successful defence of Aristotle’s choice, it is mainly because of the doctrines it presupposed; it is still probably better than anything else we have, and the dissertation’s value as a commentary is undiminished.

2. The Later Writings

When Brentano returned to consider Aristotle’s theory of the meanings of »to be« and the categories, his own philosophy had matured and he was no longer unconditionally obedient to Aristotle. In the course of his repeated attempts to come to terms with the same cluster of problems, he produced a labyrinth of essays, sketches, and notes which makes up much of his later philosophy. The documentation of his struggles and partial successes is to be found in the texts put together by Kastil under the title Kategorienlehre. The text we have is far from unitary, and it is not possible to extract a final coherent system from it, because Brentano was revising his opinions until days before his death. But we can certainly pick out a number of more or less stable positions in regard to Aristotle and the categories.

Brentano is now sharply critical of Aristotle, and on several occasions lists the latter’s mistakes, for instance, in not accepting accidents. But his main criticism centres on Aristotle’s mereology, or theory of part and whole. According to Aristotle, not both a whole and its (proper) part can be actual at the same time. If the part is actual, the part exists only potentially. Brentano contrasts this with Leibniz, for whom only monads, objects without parts, are real, and aggregates of these are not real units. Both are wrong, says Brentano, and of course he is right. His favourite counterexample is a spatial continuum. Both it and its parts are real. So Brentano emphasizes against both Aristotle and Leibniz that an aggregate or plurality of things is itself a thing. Unfortunately he, like Leibniz, fails to distinguish between an aggregate in the sense of a plurality of individuals, something of which a number greater than one is truly predicable (e.g. the several apples in a bowl), and an individual, such as a single apple, of which only one is truly predicable, but which nevertheless has several parts. This confusion leads him to assign a special position in his ontology to a two kinds of atomic substances, which he calls »ultimately unitary«, namely extensionless points and monadic souls. If non-atoms (objects with proper parts) are confused with pluralities, one is bound to believe there are atoms, since a plurality is many units and presupposes them, so there must be ultimate atomic units, since otherwise everything would be a plurality, which is absurd. This is Leibniz’s knockdown argument for monads. But if we clarify the distinction between an
individual which has proper parts, and the plurality, the objects which are its proper parts, we are free to entertain the proposition that everything has proper parts and there are no ultimate unities in Brentano's sense. No doubt Brentano would have kept souls, and the assumption that every corporeal object has proper parts entails, if there are any bodies, the existence of infinitely many, which Brentano expressly denies. But his atomism can no longer be derived from mereology alone, and must be defended on other grounds.

3. Mistakes in Brentano's Interpretation of Aristotle

Brentano makes Aristotle's mereology responsible for his view that 'to be' said in the various categories is not univocal. According to this view, the whole made up a substance and its accidents is such that not both it and its part, the substance, can be fully real at the same time. Since Aristotle accepts the reality of the substance throughout, the whole cannot be fully real and therefore the accidents which accrue to the substance are also not fully real. Hence predications in which an accident is predicated of a substance express inauthentic senses of 'be'.

One criticises Brentano's interpretation of Aristotle with trepidation, but in this case I think Brentano has picked the wrong explanation. Aristotle's belief that there are as many predicative senses of 'be' as there are categories is based not on his mereology but on his theory of definition. When we define a species by means of genus and specific difference, Aristotle requires in effect that the extension of the difference lie partly outside of the genus. In the case of both 'being' and 'one', since any difference falls under both of these, the condition for a proper definition cannot be fulfilled. Hence 'being' cannot be a genus, and 'be' cannot be univocal in the different categories, since a word can only be univocal with reference to a common genus.

There is collateral evidence that it cannot be Aristotle's mereology which leads him to deny the univocality of predicative 'be': the concept of substance undergoes development between the Categories and the Metaphysics. In the former, substance is the concrete individual: this man, this horse. In the latter, it is Aristotle's considered opinion that substance is the substantial form of a concrete individual. The composite of form and matter is not substance, because it is posterior to form, and matter is not substance because it is only potential. The concrete individual is then the composite of substantial and accidental forms with matter. It is true that in the mature work (rudimentary) mereological considerations play a part, but the reason for denying univocality to 'be' is given whether we take substance as the concrete individual or as substantial form. Admittedly, Aristotle does not draw the consequence until the Metaphysics, but it was open to him to draw it independently of the revision of the substance concept, since the doctrine on definition which we have cited is to be found in the early Topics. Overlooking the development, Brentano also overlooks that Aristotle's reasons are not mereological.
I have a final half-objection to Brentano’s interpretation. Aristotle’s term ‘accident’ has several meanings. In his list of equivocal words he says an accident is something which belongs to something but not of necessity or for the most part. When contrasted with ‘substance’, ‘accident’ means simply what »comes to« the substance. This is a different meaning, because some things »coming to« substances are not accidental, e.g. four-leggedness of horses. But when talking about the accidental sense of ‘be’ he sometimes uses examples of predication in which the natural predicate is in subject position, e.g. »This musical (person) is a man« instead of »This man is musical«. This makes it look as though an accidental predication is just one which puts a grammatically natural predicate in subject position, and Brentano indeed tends to see it this way. Hence he tends to regard the expression for an accident as basically nominal in form, ‘a musical (person)’, ‘a three yard long (thing)’, something which is grammatically much less strained in Greek and German than in English. But this grammatical account fails to connect with the basic meaning of ‘accidental’ as ‘exceptional’, and also overlooks the fact that Aristotle sometimes gives examples which are perfectly normal grammatically, as »The man is musical«. In favouring the nominal version over the adjectival, prepositional, verbal and adverbial expressions of categories, Brentano is already, as early as the dissertation, preparing the way for his reversal of Aristotle’s view of the relation between substance and accident, and laying the grammatical basis for his later reism.

4. Reism and Predication

In his later work, Brentano maintains that ’is’ is used in several senses, as did Aristotle, and he regards only one kind of use as »authentic« (eigentlich). Inauthentic uses are accepted by Brentano as practically useful façons de parler, but they engender »fictions« if taken ontologically seriously and can then lead to inflated ontologies. (Brentano’s analysis of what happened to those of his pupils who strayed from the One True Path). Among such fictive uses are those describing something as being thought of, being true, being possible, being past or future, being Man, and being the class of all men. Pure objects of thought, truths in themselves, possibilities, past and future things, universals and concept extensions are all fictions. I shall not deal here with inauthentic being or with Brentano’s theory of relations.

In authentic predicative uses of ‘be’, which Brentano thinks is univocal and means ‘is a thing’, authentic predication lines up with mereological relations, although it would be going too far to say Brentano reduces predication to mereology. We know that simple predications for Brentano are positive or negative existentials, and he sometimes goes so far as to say that because »A tree is green« is equivalent to »A green tree exists«, so we can actually say »A tree exists green«. However, whether or not this was his considered opinion,
Brentano's theory of predication is in any case inadequate. He cannot put singular judgements into words with the means of expression he officially recognizes.23

Let us however overlook this and consider how he sees predication, given the additional device of singular terms. It is by now well enough known24 that Brentano considers a true predication like »Joachim tastes a 1983 Riesling Spätlese« as true because there are two not wholly distinct objects, a subject, in this case, a substance, namely Joachim (an extensionless soul) and an accident, a wine-taster, which has Joachim as a proper part. When Joachim stops tasting the wine, he continues to exist, but the wine-taster ceases to exist. The substance can exist and continue to exist without the accident, but not vice versa. The accident cannot survive alone. The substance is enriched to yield the accident, but is not enriched by the addition of any part. The accident can itself be enriched further, as when Joachim judges that the wine is dry and takes pleasure in its being dry. The wine-taster is then encompassed by a dry-wine-judger and this in turn by a liker-of-the-dry-wine. So we have accidents which have accidents as their subjects, and the whole resembles a nest of Chinese boxes.25

5. The Question of Mereological Essentialism

In his illuminating account of Brentano's theory of substance and accident, Chisholm ascribes to Brentano a position which he (Chisholm) upholds, namely mereological essentialism (ME), the view that the parts of an object are essential to it.26 In the case of substrate and accident, ME is indeed a plausible view, because the accident is more or less defined in such a way that its substrate is part of it, and the idea of accidents wandering from one substrate to another is generally held to be repugnant. For points and souls, which have no parts, ME is trivially true. However I have been able to find no explicit statement of ME in Brentano's writings. In the Kategorienlehre there are two statements by Kusel which approach but do not amount to ME, in which he says that »part« is syncategorematic whereas »whole« (meaning »what includes parts« is categorematic.27 In the Untersuchungen zur Sinnespsychologie there is a passage where Brentano accepts the view that sensations are individuated by their position in some sort of »space«,28 which would imply that the parts of a sensation are essential to it. But again there is no general theoretical statement. On the other hand, there are statements which seem to go against ME. In his last theory of corporeal being, Brentano says that bodies can be thought of as accidents which adhere to the one spatial substance, absolute space, and displace themselves from one part of it to another, move from place to place.29 Likewise wave motion and the motion of systems of bodies (i.e. qualities) are the translation of qualities from place to place.30 Of course it requires no great feat of dialectic to see how to interpret Brentano's words in a way compatible with ME. Instead of
saying that qualities literally wander from one place to another, we can say that
neighbouring places successively take on certain qualities, but no quality, which
is an accident of a place, itself wanders from one place to another. Kastil loses
no time in »correcting« Brentano in this way in a note.31 Caveat lector! We are
dealing with an unstable and uncompleted phase of Brentano's last thoughts,
and the fact that his words, taken at face value, are incompatible with ME, does
not mean his words should not be taken at face value. In the absence of
corroborating evidence, it should be treated as indeterminate whether Brent-
ano's new thoughts on motion should or should not be taken as an indication
that he was prepared to drop ME. It may well be that ME applies de facto to all
the things that Brentano is ultimately willing to accept in his ontology. If e.g. we
only have souls, places, and unwandering accidents of these, then Brentano's
ontology will satisfy ME, albeit that there is seemingly no statement of it by
him. But lacking a consistent and definitive statement of Brentano's ultimate
ontology the ascription of ME to him must be assigned the status »Not prov-
en«.32

6. Brentano's Last Theory of Bodily Motion

The last theory of motion is of interest for its own sake. The idea is that bodies
are not substantial but are accidents or clusters of accidents of parts of a finite
absolute space, so that space and its parts are substantial. Admittedly Brentano
entertains the theory only as an hypothesis,33 but one has the impression he is
favourably inclined towards it. We can illustrate the theory by considering the
analogy with a television screen. Suppose we have a kind of television screen
consisting of finitely many pictorial elements (»pixels«), each of which can take
on any colour (real televisions are not like this). Then by suitably varying the
colour of each element, we can simulate the motion of a body across the screen.
As we know from television, the illusion works. Now imagine a three-dimensio-
nal version in which each element can take on any quality from each range of
determinable qualities. Then we have a clear idea of Brentano's absolute space,
except that Brentano does not commit himself to discrete elements. Among the
sensory qualities that can modify any element are electric charge, magnetic in-
tensity and so on, and on a larger scale we get the various degrees of hardness
of bodies, so that interpenetration of spatial objects is no more and no less pos-
sible than in our world. In fact, to the observer there would be no way to distin-
guish Brentano's world from ours.

Brentano's view has conceptual repercussions, however. If we assume ME,
then it should be clear that on Brentano's view nothing moves, either absolutely
or relatively. For something to move is for it to successively occupy or qualify
different places, whether absolute or relative to some system of bodies. But
precisely that is ruled out by the conjunction of Brentano's theory with ME.
Nothing -- no thing -- moves from place to place, because places are parts of
things and no thing can change its parts. Contrast the apparent motion of an image of an aeroplane on a television screen with the real motion of a real fly walking across the surface of the screen. In Brentano’s world, there are no things like the fly. So things that move are not real things, but rather, like the image, what Chisholm calls *entia successiva*. In the end, this view is not so far from Aristotle as might appear. Aristotle’s considered view on corporeal substances makes them rather like disturbances in prime matter, in much the same way as Brentano makes them rather like disturbances in absolute space, one difference being that Brentano’s space, unlike Aristotle’s prime matter, is actual and not just potential. However another consequence of ME is that the place of any spatial thing is essential to it: nothing could have been elsewhere than where it actually is. I do not know whether Brentano accepted this.

I must say I find Brentano’s theory incredible, though it is not so easy as one might think to find strong metaphysical counterarguments. There is one point of indeterminacy however. If a uniform patch of red colour »moves«, then while we can clearly say that this involves elements at the leading edge becoming red and those at the trailing edge becoming not-red, it is not clear whether the red-places in the middle are new each instant or whether each red-place lasts from the time when the leading edge comes to it to the time the trailing edge comes to it. If we consider motion in one dimension and represent time as going from top to bottom, letting letters name individual red-places, which picture is correct?

\[
\begin{align*}
\ldots \text{abcdef} \ldots & \quad \ldots \text{abcdef} \ldots \\
\ldots \text{bcdef} \ldots & \quad \ldots \text{fgih} \ldots \\
\ldots \text{cdefg} \ldots & \quad \ldots \text{klnmo} \ldots \\
\ldots \text{defgh} \ldots & \quad \ldots \text{pqrst} \ldots \\
\ldots \text{efghi} \ldots & \quad \ldots \text{uvwxyz} \ldots
\end{align*}
\]

Brentano’s view of space as substance arises because he sees substance as that which confers individuality. On this view, the picture on the left is more likely to be correct. But we must also take into account Brentano’s Augustinian view that God is continuously recreating the material world, which makes the picture on the right more plausible. It strikes me as anachronistic that the nominalist Brentano should lay such store by individuation. For those who believe in universals, there must be something which individuates, because common natures are precisely common, and cannot »generate« individuals alone. But nominalists usually accept that individuals just are individuals, without requiring something to individuate them. Brentano’s insistence on the importance of individuation may be a relic of an earlier phase of his thought: the paper in the *Untersuchungen zur Sinnespsychologie* from which the example favourable to ME was taken is largely concerned with the individuation of sensory qualities.

Brentano’s theory of individuation has at least two undesirable consequences. One is that the individuators -- souls and places -- are never given to us, even
secondarily, in experience, although they are known to exist. I detect shades of
Locke's reticent substances and Berkeley's elusive spirits. The historian of
philosophy Brentano must have known what fate met these. At the hands of
Berkeley and Hume respectively they were dissolved in favour of bundles or
congeries of ideas, and one would think some kind of bundle theory would solve
Brentano's problem.37 A nominalist need not fear that bundles of individuals fail
of individuality unless he confuses the bundle as a whole with the bundle as a
plurality. But Brentano makes precisely this mistake, so perhaps we now have
the underlying reason for his need of individuators, intrinsic units literally at the
heart of each congeries of what would otherwise be individuals external to one
another. Since a substance and its various accidents are nevertheless numeri-
cally distinct from one another, the existence of a common part, the substance,
cannot prevent them from being a plurality. Perhaps this is a partial explana-
tion for Brentano's unclearly formulated doctrine that a whole and its parts are not
wholly distinct.38 Of course a whole and its part have the latter in common, but
while sharing of parts admits of degrees, numerical difference does not. Pace
Brentano, he who has a single apple in his hand thereby has more than a thou-
sand apple-halves in his hand, since the apple is divisible in many ways, though
because of the way they overlap all these apple halves together make up only
one apple and not five hundred. Hence the appeal to substance as a common
part does not rescue the plurality of accidents containing it from lack of individ-
uality unless one confounds wholes and pluralities from the start. Here we see
into what tangles the confusion may lead.

The second unpleasant consequence of Brentano's theory of space as ultimate
substance is that it breaks, in the case of non-psychological things, the natural
connection between the substance/accident relation and predication. For while
in the psychological case we do predicate perceiving, thinking etc. of our selves,
we do not predicate being an apple or apple-ness of the place where the apple is.
That of which 'is an apple' is truly predicated is the apple itself. There is a pre-
cedent for Brentano's move in Aristotle, who says at one point that we predi-
cate substantial form of matter,39 and we have already seen that Brentano's ab-
solute space takes on some of the functions of Aristotle's prime matter. How-
ever a precedent is not an excuse: we predicate »apple« not of prime matter, but
of individual apples, as in the simpler Categories account. It was the privileged
position of such »what it is« predications which was a major motivation for the
primacy of first substances in Aristotle's metaphysics. In their place Brentano
can offer us only departed ghosts.

6. Classes of Substance and Accident

Because Brentano has abandoned the Aristotelian view that 'is' means some-
thing different in each category, he is free to develop subclasses of substances
and accidents without multiplying meanings of 'be'. In the long development of
his later views, he gradually shifted his interest from the meanings of 'be' to the different kinds of substance and accident. It should first be pointed out that Brentano does not give a satisfactory definition of 'substance'. He does say that a substance is a being to which only such specific differences apply as are indispensable for it or even just a part of it to continue to exist as an individual.\textsuperscript{40} Regimenting this syntactically unclear statement in the most plausible way yields x is a substance: Df. for all F: x is F if and only if necessarily: for all y, if y exists and y is a part of x, then x is F.

which would imply that loss of such an essential property of x would spell doom not only for x but for all its parts, something which goes against Brentano's own views on continua. A continuum as a whole does not survive the annihilation of a part (so ME applies to continua), but if part of it is annihilated the remainder may carry on existing.\textsuperscript{41} A second consequence of the definition of substance appears to be that a substance can continue to exist without any accidents. This is surely impossible if bodies are substances. A body need not have just this shape or colour, but it must have some shape or colour. For souls and places the doctrine has less implausibility. But perhaps by 'specific differences' Brentano means only essential properties of the substance. In that case we must replace »x is F« on the left-hand side of the definiens by »x is essentially F«. The definition is then rescued from triviality only by the implausible condition on parts. Elsewhere Brentano characterizes substances only negatively as things that are not accidents.\textsuperscript{42}

Substances are classified in various dimensions (Brentano drops Aristotle's ban on cross-classification). They may be ultimately initary (atomic, without parts) or non-atomic. Atomic substances comprise souls and points and nothing else. Non-atomic substances differ as to whether they have finitely many atomic parts or elements (collectives) or indefinitely many (continua). Brentano denies the existence of actual infinities, which is why he uses the expression »indefinitely many«. The difficulties to which this leads will have to be left aside here. Substances may be such as to be able to exist alone, not as parts of something else. In this case Brentano calls them things-for-themselves. Bodies belong here until they lose their substantial status. By contrast boundaries (of two, one or zero dimensions, i.e. surfaces, lines, and points) cannot exist for themselves, but only as part of something which they bound. Finally, there are substances which cannot do so. The former comprise only God, the latter everything else.\textsuperscript{43} Despite this variety among substances, Brentano thinks that in substantial predications the predicate is said of the subject in only one way.\textsuperscript{44}

On the other hand in accidental predications, although 'is' means the same throughout, the predicates do not all apply to their subjects in the same way. There are indeed as many accidental categories, as there are determinable kinds of accident.\textsuperscript{45} Among accidental predications applying to atomic substances, Brentano distinguishes between inferences and passive affections. The former can continue to apply to their subjects without causal assistance form out-
side. They include qualities of bodies and dispositions of the soul like virtue and knowledge. On the other hand passive affections or undergoings (Erleidungen) require constant causal activity from outside in order to remain in their subjects.\textsuperscript{46} Some undergoings lead to a final state, as when a change of place leads to a body being somewhere else, or a change of color leads to something's having a different colour. These are called changes or transformations (Umwandlungen). Other passive affections such as acts of consciousness are not changes from one state to another. Among the accidents applying to non-atoms are those of number, shape, size, and disposition of parts (attitude).\textsuperscript{47} Brentano also deals with inauthentic predications, including relatives, under the heading of denominationes extrinsecae. But these raise many issues of their own and cannot be dealt with here.

7. Defective Mereology, »Bizarre Intermediate Things«, and Fists

According to Brentano, a substrate enriched to produce an accident is not enriched by the addition of any part.\textsuperscript{48} The substrate is one-sidedly detachable from the accident; it can exist alone without the accident, the accident cannot exist without the substrate. Brentano's statements are not without their difficulties from an interpretative point of view, but here I shall take them at face value. Chisbolm has defined the substrate/accident relation for Brentano as that of immediate part to whole.\textsuperscript{49} If we write ,< for (proper) part, then

\[ x \text{ is an immediate part of } y = \text{Df. } x < y \text{ and there is no } z \text{ such that } x < z \text{ and } z < y. \]

This may coincide extensionally with Brentano's notion of the substrate/accident relation, but I find no statement of it in Brentano and I doubt whether it is the proper conceptual analysis. Certainly being an immediate part of something is not the same as being a substrate of it, because a substrate of a substrate of an accident is still a substrate of the whole accident, as in the sequence: soul - presenter of wine - affirmer of wine - liker of wine. But the soul is not an immediate part of the liker of wine, since there are two parts between, yet we do not get from soul to liker of wine by adding any parts. Another reason why the immediate part relation is not a correct analysis of Brentano's substrate/accident relation is that a believer in spatial atoms can accept that one individual can have another as immediate part, as e.g. the half-open, half-closed real interval \((0, 1)\) is an immediate part of the closed interval \((0, 1)\), but the whole is not an accident of its immediate part. Brentano did not believe there were such cases,\textsuperscript{50} but that does not affect the question of analysis, which has to preserve meaning and not just extension.

Brentano's mereology thus offends against a principle of general mereology which I have called the Weak Supplementation Principle:\textsuperscript{51} if an individual has a proper part, it has another proper part disjoint from the first. Now this is no ordinary principle, but one which is, in my view, analytically contained in the con-
cept of part in just the same way as its transitivity. It serves to distinguish part/whole relations from other irreflexive transitive relations such as being larger than. If Brentano persists in wanting the substrate/accident relation to be as it is, we ought to deny that it is a part/whole relation. It nevertheless obviously has something in common with usual part/whole relations, and this needs to be properly clarified. Saying that it is a part/whole relation which deviates from the usual one does not help us unless we know exactly what principles hold for it (we already know one that does not).

For those inclined to accept that it is a part/whole relation, a way out is offered by one passage in Brentano, where he says that it is impossible to specify another separable part alongside the substrate which makes up the whole.52 We can accept this and still legitimately use mereological vocabulary provided we are prepared to accept inseparable parts. This was indeed the step taken by Stumpf and elaborated by Husserl.53 Since inseparable parts are not capable of existence outside the whole they are in, we preserve the main point of Brentano’s theory while remaining true to mereology, and, one might add, to the traditional (Aristotelian) theory of accidents.54 Brentano admits that such a way of speaking may have its uses, but he condemns it as a fiction55 and describes such dependent or logical parts as «that bizarre kind of intermediate thing falling between absurd universals and real individual things.»56

Brentano’s opposition to dependent parts is justified if everything they can do his accidents can do at least as well. In that case he owes us a literal account of his substrate/accident relation, which we can give57 because we can accept a Brentanian accident as a whole consisting of a part which can exist alone and a second part, which cannot exist without the first.

I nevertheless consider Brentano was right to hold that an individual quality such as a redness is not part of the red thing, although it is of the red thing and cannot exist without other individuals in or of the red thing. In this case I would agree with Aristotle that the redness is not in the red thing as part is to whole,58 even in a (dubious) wider sense of 'part'. One inclining reason is that if we take the individual redness as a state and hence as something with temporal parts, if the state is a part of the red thing, the red thing too has temporal parts. But the red thing (an apple, say) is a continuant, and does not have temporal parts. If the redness is not a state (of being red), we must explain why we need both it and the state of being red, the latter appearing unproblematical.

Consider another example, where the 'plus' required is easily visualized: a fist, which is a clenched hand. The fist is one-sidedly dependent on the hand, but we do not get a fist by adding a part to the hand, but rather by altering the configuration of its parts. Rejecting the possibility that the individual clenchedness is a part of the fist, what distinguishes the hand and the fist? It is very plausible to say that the hand is part of the fist (no part of the hand is missing) when the fist exists (we have to tense the part/whole relation), but are there any other parts? I think not. We might want to say that by putting the thumb in contact with the fingers new objects come into being which straddle the join, but I do not see
why we cannot just say that a previously scattered object consisting of parts of the fingers and thumb is collected together when the fist is made. If, as I think, the fist has no proper parts that the hand lacks, when the fist exists, it and the hand have all the same parts. But they are not identical, since the hand outlasts the fist, and there is no such thing as temporary identity. So we see that having the same parts does not necessarily make individuals identical. The individual state of clenchedness may not be part of the fist, but it is still what makes the difference between hand and fist. For clenchedness is essential to fists but not hands. Hence when we unclench a hand, a fist ceases to exist, but the hand that was its substrate survives the change.

There are other cases where we seem to refer to the same individual using two different expressions, where Brentano would say there are two, one of which is an accident of the other. For instance, Socrates the teacher of Plato would be a distinct thing from plain Socrates, modally enriching Socrates only at those times at which he is the teacher of Plato. In this case I think Brentano multiplies entities beyond necessity and we should follow the Aristotelian/Fregean solution: the difference lies not in the things signified but in the mode of signifying.

From this brief survey it will be seen that I would deal with Brentano’s accidents in a non-uniform way. Sympathetic as I am to his attempt to put merology at the centre of ontological considerations, I think we cannot today follow his theory. How much of it can be rescued is another matter.
References
Standard works (Aristotle, Kant) are not given, as they are referred to in standard fashion. Expressions in brackets are the abbreviations used in the notes.


Notes
For the abbreviations used, see the list of references.
1 A81/B107.
Trendelenburg 1846, 23-4.
Benveniste 1966.
Kahn 1976.
MBSA 175. The italicized expressions do not stand for genera.
Cf. KL 106 ff., TC 84 ff.
KL 11-12, TC 19-20; KL 266, TC 189.
Monodology, §2.
The axiom of atomicity is independent of the axioms of general mereology. Cf. Parts, 41-2.
Cf. Categories 1 a 1-11.
Metaphysics 1029 a 29-33.
Topics 122 b 20-22. Cf. also Posterior Analytics 96 a 24 ff.
The subject is dealt with clearly in Moser 1935, a work which arose out of discussions with Kastil about Aristotle and Brentano (cf. the Vorwort.)
Metaphysics 1025 a 14.
Metaphysics 1017 a 9.
MBSA 13 ff. Cf. KL 26 f.
Metaphysics 1017 a 9.
KL 6-11, TC 17-19 (two paragraphs ((c) and (d) on KL 8-9) are missing from the English translation); KL 13-16, TC 20-3; KL 19-21, TC 24-6; KL 58-62, TC 51-4. This is the late Brentano at his most repetitive.
On relations cf. KL 166 ff., TC 125 ff.
These are thetic judgements of the form »An A exists«, »No A exists«. Synthetic or double judgements are more complex.
KL 225, TC 163.
To be able to say a term signifies exactly one individual, Brentano would need to add quantifiers binding term variables. Cf. Simons 1984.
Cf. the diagrams in Smith 1987.
For Chisholm's ME see his 1976, Appendix B. For the ascription to Brentano cf. BCSA 202, BMS 8.
KL xxv, 306n1, TC 213-4n8.
USP 67, 70. I am indebted to Professor Chisholm for drawing the passages to my attention. Chisholm's view is that ME is there implicit. I would say that they import implicit ME at most for sensations, not as a general doctrine. For general ME we need corroboration from elsewhere.
KL 298, TC 209. The Chisholm/Guterman translation of »Stellenwechsel und [...] ruhiges Beharren« (sc. of qualitative accidents) as »interchange and preservation« is unfortunate: it would be much more natural to say »change of place and remaining still«. Their translation of Verschiebung as »displacement« is on the other hand just right.
KL 299, TC 210.
KL 392n8, TC 270n440.
32 I do not deny that further evidence may decide the issue. But we see the dangers of sympathetic commentary. Kastil and Kraus, Brentano's most loyal defenders, took their "sympathy" so far that they tended to obscure Brentano by covering up some of his more obviously unacceptable views, disqualifying his inconsistencies and pressing his subtleties into rather too simple mould. It is an illuminating exercise to read Brentano's texts without looking at their notes.

33 KL 298, TC 209. The passage is a good demonstration of Brentano's extraordinary intellectual flexibility in old age. In a note (KL 392n12, TC 270-1n442) Kastil quotes a passage dictated by Brentano which shows he is prepared to accept relativity theory. In this he contrasts well with Kraus, who later attacked relativity theory in a way which can only be described as hysterical.

34 Cf. Chisholm 1976, 98.

35 For a graphic account of Aristotle's view see Purth 1978, 638-9.

36 Different letters name different but qualitatively exactly similar rednesses. There are further possibilities, in which rednesses last more than a minimal time but not all of the time that the place is red.


38 KL 49-50, TC 45-6.

39 Metaphysics 1029 a 23-4; 1049 a 34.


41 KL 151, TC 115.

42 KL 146, TC 111. Kastil draws the conclusion that "substance" is not a genuine name (KL 345n1a, TC 240n210), and Chisholm comes to Brentano's aid by suggesting that a substance is something which is not an accident but which may have accidents (by contrast with boundaries - BCSA 20, BMS 13).

43 For this classification, see KL 249, TC 179.

44 KL 244-5, TC 175-6.

45 KL 219-20, TC 159; KL 254, TC 181-2.

46 Cf. the table at KL 205, TC 148.

47 KL 213, TC 155; KL 245-6, TC 176.

48 KL 5, TC 16; KL 7, TC 17; KL 11-2, TC 20; KL 53, TC 47; KL 151-2, TC 115.


50 See RZK 174, STC 146.

51 Parts, 28.

52 KL 152, TC 115.

53 On Stumpf and Husserl on dependent parts see Smith and Mulligan 1982, 25-45.

54 What Smith 1987, 44 calls the A-conception as against the B-conception of one-sided detachability.

55 KL 7, TC 17.

56 KL 60, TC 52.

57 For definitions of the concepts involved see Parts, ch. 8.

58 Categories 1 a 24.

59 See Parts 213-4.