Obituary

Dale Jacquette

19 April 1953 – 22 August 2016

Dale Jacquette has died at age 63. He was stricken by a pulmonary embolism at his home in Brügg and expired the next day. He leaves his wife Tina Jacquette (*née* Traas), his son Scott, and grandsons David and Jason. Professor Jacquette was Ordentlicher Professor mit Schwerpunkt Theoretische Philosophie at Universität Bern (Senior Professorial Chair in Logic and Theoretical Philosophy). Born in Sheboygan, Wisconsin, he was educated there until high school matriculation and admission to Oberlin College. He graduated from Oberlin College in 1975 with an Honours BA in Philosophy, under the supervision of Robert Grimm. His honours thesis is entitled "Aristotle on identity and individuation". That same year he was elected to the prestigious Honour Society *Phi Beta Kappa*. Instead of taking a "gap year", which was then coming into vogue, he spent a year at Temple talking to Wisdom and Leblanc, and followed with a year at Leeds chatting with Geach, in each case enlarging his appreciation of formal mehods in philosophy. He then enrolled in the philosophy programme at Brown University and earned an MA in 1981 under the supervision of Roderick Chisholm. Two years later he received his Ph.D, also directed by Chisholm, with a dissertation entitled *The Object Theory Logic of Intention.* Before his Bern appointment in 2008, he held positions at Pennsylvania State University, University of Nebraska at Lincoln, and Franklin and Marshall College.

At his death, Dale Jacquette was the author, editor or co-editor of 34 books, and left four research monographs and one edited volume unpublished. Of particular note to me is the massive *Frege: A Philosophical Biography,* now in production with the Cambridge University Press. I say "of particular note" because I was one of the book's external readers, and was rewarded with a much richer and nuanced understanding of Frege than I

had previously enjoyed. The Frege book displays Jacquette's talents and interests on a wide canvas – a tenacious grasp of historical context, a sharp eye for expositional and biographical detail, a good grasp of German, a well-informed acquaintance with late 19th century mathematics, and with Frege's anxieties, both mathematical and philosophical, about the foundational security of arithmetic. Also evident in this manuscript, as in Jacquette's other writings, is a willingness to develop and hold views that press against received opinion. This is a typical Jacquettian virtue. In his voluminous writings, he is a "follow your nose without fear or favour" kind of philosopher, and little inclined to be part of the in-crowd, except when he agrees with it. Judging from his published books alone, his range was astonishing, especially in a world in which one-trick pony scholarship is both welcome and, one might even think, rather preferred.

Jacquette's versatility and industry are amply in play in 210 published articles and six others he left unpublished at his death, one of which now appears in this journal. Also impressive are the 119 contributions to books, and the 13 further ones not yet published. Here, too, the range is striking – Condillac, Husserl, Kripke, Humboldt, Socrates, Turing, Plato, Newton, Tarski, Mally, computability, *petitio principii*, category systems, Collingwood, Searle, Anselm, violence, paradoxes, cannabis, Burleigh, Reid, Kant, fiction, agenda relevance, quantum indeterminacy, paraconsistency, Aristotle, Goodman, Flaubert, Descartes, Twardowski, Borges, Bosanquet, analogy, Barthes, the square of opposition, socioeconomic Darwinism; and on and on. It is frequently said that there was a time when a learned and determined scholar could know everything that mattered, and that it is only since the explosions of the Enlightenment that this kind of learnedness hasn't been considered remotely conceivable. Even the most widely learned of our own day might have a hard time imagining that a large learnedness is still not only conceivable but also at times convincingly realized. The nearest versatility-comparison in contemporary English-speaking philosophy is the remarkable body of work by Nicholas Rescher.

One of the standing biases against wide-scope scholarship in philosophy arises from an understandable reservation about dilettantism, attended by the suspicion that anyone who writes about subjects as diverse as Meinong, Brentano, Wittgenstein, Berkeley, Hume, Boole, Russell, Frege, Schopenhauer, Rescher, the philosophy of mind, ontology, journalistic ethics, capital punishment, possible worlds, the philosophies of logic, mathematics,

religion and knowledge, isn't likely to be much good at any of them. There is, however, plenty of evidence that people who actually make the effort to publish the results of their wide-spread interests often stand as exceptions to such generalizations. Jacquette was never unaware of the bias against widespreadness, and he wrote with a depth and a confident determination to show that his own work was no confirmation of it. He was indeed a contrarian when he wanted to be, and it reflects well on him that his was an "eyes wide-open" one.

In 2007 Jacquette did something dangerous. He published a new translation and critical commentary of Frege's *The Foundations of Arithmetic.* In so doing, he put himself in competition with the much loved Austin translation of 1950. I myself don't think that the rivalry was intended, except possibly in a kind of double-effect way. Jacquette wasn't out to show up Austin, still less to take him down. Rather he wanted to relieve an itch. Jacquette thought he had a good translation in him, and he wanted to bring it to the surface. One of the critics took issue with how the new translation handled certain passages of Frege. He ended his review by announcing that he himself would stay with Austin's. In a way, that wouldn't have bothered Jacquette. His objective was to produce a translation which he himself thought well of, and he was not interested in convincing people to stop reading the other one. Think here of the *Tractatus*, whose first English translation was Ogden's (although he seems it was at least as much Ramsey's). Sixty-three years later came the Pears and McGuiness. Some commentators think the Pears-McGuinness is more faithful to the German, and others think that the Ramsey-Ogden better captures the music of Wittgenstein's meaning. The objective of Pears and McGuinness was not to send the predecessor-translation into retirement. It was to make available a further instrument for getting to the bottom of Wittgenstein. Both translations are widely in use to this day. That too was what Jacquette was hoping for. It is significant that in his entry in *The International Directory of Logicians* (2009), of the twenty-four listed as main publications, Jacquette gives pride of place to the Frege translation. I see in this a remarkable and durable self-possession.

We all know philosophers who have more ideas than you can shake a stick at. They attend departmental colloquia on any and all topics, and they invariably ask the best questions and make the most helpful suggestions, but rarely write up these insights for publication. Richard Cart-

wright – also an Oberlin-Brown alumnus – was like this. He was, hands down, my most stimulating and widely informed doctoral teacher, but his publication record was slight, especially in relation to the very high regard in which he was held. Cartwright was a "make haste slowly" kind of philosopher. He thought that philosophy's natural home was the common room, or conference where its transactions would be recorded in the memories of those who were present at the time.

Other philosophers are more like artists. A painter who speaks wonderfully about his painterly thinking is no painter until he paints. A composer who never gets around to writing the score of the music that runs around in his head is its composer in name only. A painter who won't show his work is a painter manqué, and a composer who declines to have his music played is an artist who's not doing his job. Philosophers are sometimes like this. They won't see themselves as philosophers unless they put their thinking on the record, that is, into cold or digital print. If such a philosopher is as versatile and widely engaged as Jacquette was, it only stands to reason that he will publish a lot and wide-rangingly. In the present-day academy, notwithstanding its publish or perish pressures, there are more Cartwrights than Jacquettes. In intellectually robust communities, there is plenty of room for both. It would do everyone some good were there more balanced representation of the philosopher as working artist and the philosopher as defensive tactician.

Jacquette was first and foremost a logician. In the *Directory* entry, his contrarianism is expressly acknowledged. He writes that the purpose of his intensional approach to logic was

> to provide a more general intuitive semantics for the truth values of propositions ostensibly about nonexistent entities, including law-governed idealizations in the language of natural science that can also do duty for predications in fiction, practical reasoning, and discourse outside of science, than was available in standard extensionalist logics and semantics, inspired by Bertrand Russell's theory of definite descriptions.

Regarding his extensive writings on the paradoxes, including the less discussed ones such as the Grelling and the Pseudo-Scotus, and his own variation "the soundness paradox", Jacquette writes that his

policy toward the paradoxes has been most profoundly influenced by Wittgenstein in both his early and later periods [and he] expects logic to cure itself as Wittgenstein maintains in both the *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* and *Notebooks 1914–1916.* This is the limited sense, especially in confronting the paradoxes, in which [my] approach to logic remains Wittgensteinian.

In his vision statement he adds:

Intensional logics in particular will increasingly take precedence over traditional extensional systems.

Any reader in 2016 familiar with the development of logic since *Principia* (1910–1913) and C. I. Lewis' axiomatizations of modal propositional systems (1912–1932), will know this to have been an understatement. In another entry in the *Directory,* Timothy Smiley writes,

Under the umbrella of "mathematical logic" I see a mass of mathematically-driven work without even a vestigial connection with the theory of argumentation. When the caravan has moved on, I hope logic will be left to return to its roots.

When we were last together, in Istanbul in June of 2015, Jacquette reminded me of this and saluted Smiley for having said it.

Although he leaves a legacy, Jacquette was never, I think, a legacy-intending philosopher. I think that his most enduring influence will be his Austrian writings. I mean by this his work on the approaches to logic and ontology developed in the period from Bentano (1838–1917), Meinong (1853–1920), Husserl (1859–1938), and Mally (1879–1944). Husserl, of course, was German, but he counts as an honourary Austrian thanks to the instruction he received from Brentano in Vienna, as a mathematician attending the lectures of a philosopher. One of Husserl's signature achievements was his recognition of psychology's importance for logic, not excluding the logic of mathematics. At the heart of the Austrian movement was the insistence that thinking in the absence of aboutness is nothing. Alongside comes the implication that extensional logic, in the manner of Frege's second-order calculus for the foundations of mathematics, was untrue to the facts of lived reasoning experience. It fails to capture the ways in which human

beings think, reason and argue. It fails on purpose. It was never Frege's intention to produce a logic of how people think, echoing a remark by Peirce about logic in its "strict" sense. It prompted Quine's admiring observation that, while logic is an ancient subject, it's been a great one only since 1879. We could say that the semantic heart of Jacquette's intensional logic is the plain and obvious truth that some things don't exist. When the suggestion was put to Quine he pretended not to understand it.

If we paid intellectually conscientious attention to what is actually happening when human beings have thoughts, we'd not fail to notice the frequency and effortlessness with which we know that what we're thinking of doesn't actually exist. This strongly suggests that when we stand in the aboutness relation to something, we bear a real relation to an object which might be an impalpable one. Consider here Jacquette's reference to the idealizations of science and the creatures of fiction. Whatever our other intimacies with him might turn out to be, one of the things we can't do with Sherlock Holmes is have him to tea or he with us. When we invoke Holmes, we might not invoke something real. But no one doubts its impalpability. No one thinks of using p as a doorstop. Fiction is an especially interesting case. It seems to make possible real connections between reality and unreality. What is sometimes overlooked is what brings such contacts to pass. Again, if we carefully attend to empirically discernible facts of fiction-making, we see that the *world* is the maker of the unreality that fiction is. Writing at his desk in Britain, it was Doyle's doings which brought about the Holmes stories, thereby bringing about the characters and events that the stories relate. In so doing, Doyle made no addition to his country's population and produced no new entries for the history of English criminal detection. Doyle stands to Holmes in the relation of having created an unreal man. This is arguably the most foundational of the real relations in which the real sometimes stand to the not real. It turns out, however, that this is not Jacquette's view of the matter.

Jacquette's is a neo-Meinongean logic. Unqualified semantic Meinongeanism has an unrestricted comprehension axiom. Its more qualified one restricts the comprehension principle to one which respects Mally's distinction between an object's nuclear and extranuclear properties. Even so, the universe of his logic remains enormous. It is everything that is a bound value of the quantifier in

"There are things that don't exist."

It is a domain of such encompassing inclusivity as to raise suggestions of promiscuity. What is therefore needed is a formal apparatus for keeping a disciplined check on how what interacts with what, and in what inference relations they are eligible for engagement. *Meinongean Logic* (1996) develops this technical machinery with precision and rigour. It is a more technically realized book than Terence Parson's groundbreaking one sixteen years before. In both these works, neo-Meinongean logic provides a general-purpose semantics for everything whatever that doesn't exist, or didn't or won't or couldn't. It is a virtue of the approach that nonexistence is afforded a wholly general and unified treatment with which to avoid *ad hoc* measures. The same rationale pervades the several other versions of noneism in the descendent class of Routley and Meyer.

One feature of neo-Meinongeanism that's attracted some deserved reservation is that all objects of whatever ontic status pre-exist any subsequent creative activity here at home. It is true at home that Vulcan was hypothesized to exist by Le Verrier (actually by Babinet), but it is not true that Vulcan is a hypothetical object. Vulcan was an object constituted by pre-existing properties. Vulcan was "there" long before Le Verrier and Babinet drew their first breaths. In a Jacquettian semantics, it is the same way with fiction. Sherlock was fictionalized by Doyle, but he was not an object of Doyle's own creation. He was the object of his constituting properties, not one of which was created by Doyle. These implications strike some commentators as odd. I myself think that they are more troublesome than odd. They reveal two competing impulses in Jacquette's intensional logic. One is its attachment to Brentano's and Husserl's psychologism, in which cognitive experience plays a central role. Another is the platonistic pull of Meinong's theory of objects, in which human thinking has no inherent role to play. The two strands don't easily cohere.

One of the breakthrough achievements in late-19th and 20th century semantics was the launching and perfecting of the mechanisms that drive the model theories of purely artificial languages. Misleadingly dubbed "formal semantics" by Tarski, model-theoretic approaches have long since been *de rigeur* in exact philosophy. Dummett has something important to say about this. Having noted the necessity of mathematical tools in structuring a system's model theory, he regrets the concomitant loss of focus on what

the model theory was wanted for in the first place. In Jacquette's approach, model theory is wanted for the systematization and precisification of Brentano's and Husserl's insights into human experiencings of aboutness. Therein lies a tension. At what point should we allow the mathematics of model theory to override empirically discernible facts of our experiencings and the truth-making conditions under which these aboutness relations depend? Scientists know a like tension between what their subject-matters ask for and what their theoretical mechanism are able to provide. Dummett is of the view, and Smiley too, that the present-day trend is for technically proficient philosophers to prefer tools to subject matter. I mention this here to flag a more general methodological point. Model-theoretic semantics are formal representations of those properties of natural language that have caught our philosophical eye. Formal representations always distort the properties they represent, variously so. The risk they carry is the potential to make these target properties unrecognizable in the model theory. It is a standing liability and a general one, and in no way peculiar to Jacquette's intensionalist semantics. So it would be neither unfair nor unfriendly to ask whether there is any significant degree to which this same assessment might hold for Jacquette's logic of nonexistence? Yes or no, the fact remains that *Meinongean Logic* is a masterly achievement and a notable effort to evade Dummett's worry.

I come now to the question of how Dale Jacquette came to be the formidable thinker he was. There is little doubt of Chisholm's influence. When Jacquette was his student in Providence, analytic philosophers had plighted their troth to the decomposition of concepts, which would render them into their simple and unanalyzable components in ways that give us a greater *à priori* understanding of them. The results of such analyses would be conceptually necessary truths, and in some quarters of enquiry would be enshrined as axioms, both insusceptible of proof and immune from overthrow. In the preface of Russell's *Principles of Mathematics* (1903), published the year following his announcement to Frege of the paradox that destroyed the conceptual truth embodied in *Grundgesetze* I's Basic Law V, Russell declared that without Moore's having led him from idealism to what came next, it would have been impossible for Russell to say anything philosophically coherent about the foundations of arithmetic. But he said this in the very aftermath of the death of the analysis that gave us the inde-

monstrable and irrefutable Basic Law V. Russell was never thereafter (how could he be) an analytic philosopher in Moore's sense.

In the United States, Moorean analysis never held centre stage, notwithstanding the attention lavished on Frege, Russell and Moore. Pragmatism was up and running at Harvard and Johns Hopkins, and critical realism, spurred on by Wilfrid Sellars' father Roy Wood, was up and running at Michigan. When Henry Johnstone Jr., a much respected colleague of Jacquette's arrived at Penn State, he had come from Middlebury College, whose philosophy department had been more than a little sympathetic to idealism. Many years ago my teacher and colleague David Savan, who had been one of Quine's students at Harvard, told me that he thought that Quine, too, was an idealist. When I was a Ph.D. student at Michigan in a seminar on White's "An untenable dualism", William Frankena warmly welcomed the idea. Meanwhile logical positivism had arrived from Europe and attained a considerable foothold for a time. But there is little that's recognizable as conceptual analysis in the writings of Carnap, Hempel, Reichenbach and the others. Major developments were stirring in places such as Pittsburgh, where Sellars *fils* was. Fruitful coalitions emerged with the pragmatism of Harvard, the inferentialism of Hilbert and Brouwer and the idealism of Hegel. Rescher was a pragmatic idealist, and Macdowell and Brandom were socially pragmatic inferentialists. However, for the most part, these non-analytic developments had no deep anchorage in Austrian phenomenology. At Brown, when Chisholm published *Perceiving* in 1957, there was little evidence of a systematized phenomenology. 1976 was a bit different. *Person and Object* appeared just as Jacquette was in Philadelphia and Leeds preparing himself for Brown. In 1981, in the sweet part of Jacquette's time in Providence, Chisholm issued *The First Person: An Essay on Reference and Intentionality.* So I take it as given that Chisholm's influence on Jacquette is unmistakable. Less clear is where Jacquette's formidable model-theoretic skills arose, I mean took hold in a deeply operational way. Certainly he will have known Chisholm's respect for formal methods in philosophy, but Jacquette's formal methods are not discernible in Chisholm's work. Jacquette had a large and friendly respect for Henry Johnstone and Salim Kermal at Penn State and, over the years for Rescher some 138 miles due west of University Park. It was Rescher who recommended him as his editorial successor at *American Philosophical Quarterly* and who was helpful in Jacquette's relocation to Bern. Jacquette read wide-

ly and profitably, and had a good eye for important work. He was quick to acknowledge his debts and generous in doing so. But in the famous words of a former deputy-Prime Minister of Canada, he was "no one's baby". He admired the philosophers he learned from but had no inclination to immerse himself in their intellectual *personae.* He admired Chisholm but was not a Chisholmian. The same is true of Rescher and the several others. Rescher was an idealist influenced by Kant and Leibniz. Jacquette was drawn to Austrian realism, and thence to Frege and Wittgenstein. The only "eanism" he ever exemplified was Meinong's. Even there he was his own kind of Meinongean. In *Meinongean Logic,* there are two footnotes to Rescher and none to Chisholm. In *Alexius Meinong,* Chisholm merits 16 mentions and Rescher one. Later Jacquette developed an agreeable acquaintance with Dagfin Follesdal in connection with their involvements with the Lauener Foundation. Follesdal had been the modal logician who was instrumental in bringing Husserl to the attention of philosophers in Palo Alto, Oslo and elsewhere. But by the time he moved to Bern, Jacquette had a fully developed intellectual character of his own. Indeed Follesdal makes no appearance in the index of *Meinongean Logic,* and makes no like appearance those nineteen years later in *Alexius Meinong.* The sole reference to Brandom is to his co-authorship with Rescher of their 1980 book on paraconsistent logic in 1980. I infer from this that from early on Jacquette was running an operating manual mainly of his own crafting.

In the forthcoming book on Frege, Jacquette reflects on the influences that brought Frege to an intellectual maturity that would trigger a revolution in philosophy. Only twice in Frege's time at school and university did he have a course on philosophy or logic. The teacher of one had written on logic but was mainly an aesthetician. The other offered a run of the mill course in what we now see as pre-Fregean logic. Frege was a mathematician who shared, but did not originate, worries about the foundational stability of mathematics. He had satisfied himself that all of mathematics could be grounded in arithmetic, provided that number theory could supply its own foundations. Thinking that it couldn't, Frege inferred that either arithmetic is groundless or its foundations lie elsewhere. He knew just enough about the boilerplate logic of the day to realize that it couldn't do the job for arithmetic. So, to put it simply, he was left with no option but to found a logic that would serve this purpose, the second-order functional calculus. Jacquette leaves the inference that Frege was mainly a thinker of his own

foundational making. That would make Frege the *pure laine* prodigy whom I too think he was. In my post-mortem reflections on our sadly departed friend, I've been drawn to a like view of him. Although not the originalist that Frege was, Dale Jacquette was an independent man of his own intellectual making, and in the end, he was more an Austrian philosopher than an American one.

For all his sheer busyness, Jacquette was a vigorous man of parts. He had an easy and welcoming nature, and was an accomplished photographer and an informed lover of music and the visual arts. He was hooked on travelling. He would go anywhere at the drop of a hat, and he favoured doing it the hard way whenever possible – by hiking, biking and always opting for deep-steerage economy class when he flew. His magnificent lectures – as witness his 2015 talks on Boole in Istanbul – were models of organization and intellectual clarity. He greatly enjoyed the discussions that followed. But he was cautious about his intimacies, none more heartfelt, nourishing and enduring than his love for his wife. I am sure that readers will wish to join me in sending her our tender condolences.

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