

BRENTANO STUDIEN

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METAPHYSICS, NATURAL SCIENCES, AND PSYCHOLOGY



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Herausgegeben von
Wilhelm Baumgartner und Guillaume Fréchette

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METAPHYSICS, NATURAL SCIENCES, AND PSYCHOLOGY

Herausgegeben von Guillaume Fréchette (Salzburg)

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The recent literature on the metaphysics of material objects has featured extensive discussion of *monism*, the thesis that the world as a whole – the cosmos – is the only material object, or at least the only *fundamental* material object. A notable byproduct of the growing interest in monism has been a rather energetic reexamination of historical forms of monism. Philosophers whose monist metaphysics has earned serious reconsideration include Parmenides (Rea 2001), Spinoza (Goff 2012, Guigon 2012), the British idealists (Schaffer 2010b) and some of the latter's American counterparts (Zimmerman forthcoming). One philosopher whose monistic musings have not yet been excavated as part of this general movement, however, is Franz Brentano. In a single known document – a dictation from 30 January 1915 (when he was 77 and completely blind) – Brentano develops what appears to be a version of monism about the material world. This brief note offers a presentation of Brentano's specific version of monism, and of his master argument for it.

ADRIAN MAÎTRE

Brentanos Gedankengang beim Beweise
für das Dasein Gottes (1915) 79

Franz Brentano hat die Frage nach dem Dasein Gottes als die theoretisch wertvollste und als von großer praktischer Bedeutung eingestuft. Gegen Ende einer fünfzigjährigen Beschäftigung mit dieser Frage hat sich Brentano im Diktat „Gedankengang beim Beweise für das Dasein Gottes“ (1915) nochmals energisch um die Grundlage für eine „vernünftige Überzeugung vom Dasein Gottes“ bemüht. Der Artikel hat den Gedankengang von 1915 zum Gegenstand und zeigt auf, dass es sich bei der Konklusion des Beweises um einen komplexen Satz handelt, dass Brentano im Beweis klassische Gottesbeweise integriert und gewichtet, diese mit neuen Argumenten ergänzt und sich dabei sowohl auf logische Ableitungen als auch auf Wahrscheinlichkeitsüberlegungen stützt, um zu der komplexen Konklusion zu gelangen. Es wird auf die Einbettung des Gedankengangs in wichtige Aspekte der Philosophie Brentanos verwiesen, wie z.B. auf dessen Herleitung des Kausalbegriffs oder seine Zeitanalysen. Die Anhänge enthalten in erster Linie Analysen und Halbformalisierungen zu den einzelnen Beweisschritten, aber auch einen kurzen Vergleich mit Brentanos früheren Beweisführungen in den Vorlesungen zum Thema, soweit diese in den publizierten Werken zu erfassen sind. Kurz vor dem 100. Todestag Franz Brentanos scheint es angemessen, einen Gegenstand seiner philosophischen Bemühungen aufzugreifen, welcher den grossen Philosophen ein Leben lang beschäftigt hat. Brentanos Bearbeitung der Gottesbeweise verdient durchaus mehr Aufmerksamkeit.

DALE JACQUETTE †

Brentano's Signature Contributions to Scientific Philosophy 127

Brentano's agreement with the discovery of inner sensation or perception and the faculty of active intellect in Aristotle reflects the exact meaning by which both thinkers regard philosophy and philosophical psychology or philosophy of mind as (externally and internally) empirical and by extension (externally and internally) scientific. Brentano's psychology is scientific in an Aristotelian sense directly inspired by the arguments of *De Anima*. It recognizes and builds its explanations on inner as well as outer sense and perception in establishing empirical experiential foundations for knowledge. Aristotelian-Brentanian philosophical psychology avails itself

of the mind's active as well as passive cognitive capabilities in taking the first steps toward a scientific proto-phenomenology. It is in his combined expansively outer and inner empirical psychology of passive and active intellect that Brentano's signature contributions to an Aristotelian sense of scientific philosophy are most instructively ascertained.

BEN SHEREDOS

Brentano's Act Psychology Was Not Aristotelian
(Or Else, Not Empirical) 157

Brentano's *Psychology* constantly refers to mental phenomena as "mental acts," yet there has been surprisingly little effort devoted to discerning the significance of the term "act" in this context. A widespread implicit view is (1) that it is merely a *technical* term, and does not literally invoke any connotations of action at all. But since many regard the *Psychology* as riddled with Aristotelian assumptions, some also suggest (2) that Brentano's talk of "mental acts" is a *significant* holdover from his Aristotelian pedigree. Here I argue, negatively, that both claims are deeply problematic. First, traditional readings of Brentano (by, e.g., Oskar Kraus) in terms of (1) are incapable of supporting some of Brentano's most central commitments regarding inner perception and the method of psychology. Second, Brentano's own conception of Aristotelianism is such that if (2) were true, (1) would be false. Finally, if (2) were true in any significant sense, then Brentano would simply fail to do what he sets out to do in his empirical psychology. I thus call for renewed attention to Brentano's conception of "mental acts."

DENIS FISETTE

Phenomena and Mental Functions.
Karl Bühler and Stumpf's Program in Psychology 191

This study focuses on the influence of the work of Carl Stumpf on the thought of Karl Bühler. Our working hypothesis is based on the philosophical program that Bühler attributes to Stumpf and to which several of his works are largely indebted. It is divided into five parts. The first is intended to establish a relationship between Bühler and the school of Brentano to which Stumpf belongs. In the second part, I show that Bühler became aware of Brentano's ideas and of Stumpf's program during a stay at the Institute of Psychology of Berlin during the winter semester 1904–1905. I briefly comment, in the third part, on Bühler's references to the work of

Stumpf and on two of his books in which he defended Stumpf's program against his critics. After having established the solid knowledge that Bühler had of Stumpf's work, I outline, in the fourth part, the main aspects of this program and evaluate, in the fifth, how Bühler uses it in the field of sensory phenomena (*gestalt*). I conclude this study with several remarks on Stumpf's positive evaluation of the work of Bühler.

PETER ANDRAS VARGA

The *Impersonalien Controversy* in Early Phenomenology.

Sigwart and the School of Brentano 229

The puzzle of sentences lacking proper grammatical subjects not only challenged mainstream logical and psychological theories of judgements in post-Hegelian German academic philosophy, but it also gave rise to a historically well-defined controversy between Christoph Sigwart, a major logician of that time, and the School of Brentano in the 1880s. I analyze Sigwart's biographical and philosophical trajectory and the early interactions between him and the nascent School of Brentano. The controversy was triggered by a philosophical and academic alliance between Brentano and a colleague of him in Vienna, the linguist Franz Miklosich, which I reconstruct through an investigation of Brentano's theory of judgement and its contemporaneous reception, as well as through a microhistorical analysis of the genesis of Brentano's *Psychologie* of 1874 and his appointment to Vienna. I provide a detailed reconstruction of the actual controversy that was to a large extent fought as a proxy war between Sigwart and Brentano's orthodox disciple Anton Marty and gradually evolved into a cluster of debates on issues in the philosophy of language, burdened by *ad hominem* attacks. I argue that the controversy was fundamentally shifted by Brentano's personal intervention in 1889 but, at the same time, Sigwart's original theory of denominative judgements, the merits of which went unnoticed in his debate with Marty, is worth being studied on its own. I investigate the strata of Edmund Husserl's engagement with Sigwart and use Husserl's marginal notes in his copy of Sigwart's *Logik* to argue for an influence of Sigwart's theory of denominative judgements on Husserl's descriptive analysis of judgements and their fulfillments, especially on Husserl's idea of categorial intuition. In sum, the *Impersonalien Controversy* could be added to the list of historiographically relevant controversies in the post-Hegelian German academic philosophy (e.g., the recently highlighted *Ignorabimus* controversy, the debates on materialism and Darwinism, the less-known pessimism

or the well-known psychologism controversies) and, furthermore, it could constitute one of the historically well-defined links between Early Phenomenology and the contemporaneous post-Hegelian German academic philosophy.

MARIO ARIEL GONZÁLEZ PORTA

Kerry and the Evolution of Frege's Critique of Psychologism 281

Frege's criticism of psychologism evolved over time. The main point of this evolution is the passage from the criticism of psychologism in the "Foundations of arithmetic" to that of the "Basic laws of arithmetic". The determining role in this passage is played by the criticism Frege received from Kerry.

KLAUS HEDWIG

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